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IN DEFENSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
MICHAEL CONANT t
I. INTRODUCTION
As Professor Davis has so ably demonstrated, the many complex
economic institutions in our society which are inadequately controlled
by the automatic forces of competitive markets make administrative reg-
ulation a necessity.' Since continuance of the administrative process
is a necessary fact of an industrial society, the material issue is the solu-
tion of its major problems.' The foremost problem is to obtain effi-
cient regulation in the public interest while protecting those regulated
from possibly vague or arbitrary rule.' The thesis of this study is that
the Constitution itself and many related common-law concepts contain at
least part of the answer to this key problem.
Instead of deprecating the constitutional separation of powers as
an impediment to administrative regulation, it will be argued that sep-
arated powers can be a valuable instrument in creating effective regula-,
tion. Using rigorous definitions of the three departments of govern-
ment, it will be shown that (1) there has never been a constitutional
impediment to the delegation of secondary legislative functions, (2) in-
telligible standards in enabling statutes are the prime protection against
arbitrary administration, (3) many executive functions of administra-
tive agencies are incorrectly classified as adjudicatory or quasi-judicial,
and procedures for them inappropriately judicialized, (4) since legisla-
tures have no judicial power to delegate to administrative agencies, at-
tempts by such agencies to exercise clearly judicial functions are uncon--
stitutional usurpations of judicial power, and (5) courts can perform
clearly judicial functions with greater speed, efficiency and fairness,
than can administrative agencies.
t Associate Professor of Business Administration, University of California
(Berkeley) ; Member, Illinois Bar.
1. 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIES § 3.14 (1958).
2. See generally Jackson, The Administrative Process, 5 J. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 143
(1940).
3. For a general discussion of the problem of limiting discretion of public officials
by rule of law, see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1886) ; DICKINSON, AD-
MINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 32-36 (1927); PRETTYMAN, TRIAL
BY AGENCY 10 (1959) ; Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUm. L. REV. 696, 709
(1913).
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II. THE LOGIC OF SEPARATED POWERS AND DELEGATED SECONDARY
FUNCTIONS
The doctrine of separation of powers is a basic constitutional prin-
ciple of free government." The prosecutor who is also judge in the
same actions and the judge who has authority to amend or ignore valid
statutes are men with more power than is consistent with free society.
The checks and balances of separated governmental powers were design-
ed so that our trial courts could forestall in their incipiency all extra-
legal uses of power. Recently, former regulatory commissioners have
charged that the concentration of powers in their agencies has fostered
arbitrary actions, curbed only slightly by limited judicial review.5 This
study will demonstrate that regulatory agencies can be structured so that
the many safeguards of separated powers can be observed without im-
peding administrative regulation.
The fundamental idea of separation of powers is (with specified
exceptions) the initial vesting of the powers of government in three
separate and independent departments-legislative, executive and judi-
cial.6 The first essential of independence is that persons holding office in
4. "If there is a principle in our Constitution, indeed in any free Constitution, more
sacred than another, it is that which separates the Legislative, Executive and Judicial
powers." Madison, 1 Annals of Congress 581, in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
116 (1926). "Our government, like all other free government, . . . consists of depart-
ments, and contains a marked separation of the legislative and judicial powers. . . . No
maxim has been more universally received and cherished as a vital principle of freedom."
Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. R. 477, 508-09 (N.Y. 1811) (Kent, C. J.). See Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190-91 (1880) ; VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARA-
TION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE (1953).
The separation of powers, though not stated in the Constitution, is implied by the
vesting of each of the three powers in a distinct branch of government. National Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590-91 (1949) ; Springer v. Philippine
Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926);
Fairlie, The Separation of Powers, 21 MIcH. L. REv. 393, 398 (1923) ; Friedrich, Separa-
tion of Powers, 13 ENCYC. Soc. ScI. 663, 664 (1934). See Sharp, The Classical Ameri-
can Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. CHl. L. REV. 385, 420-34 (1935), for
a discussion of the intent of the framers of the Constitution in separating powers so
they would operate as checks on one another; Wright, The Origins of the Separation of
Powers in America, 13 EcoNomIcA 169 (1933) ; ERLiCE, LA S9PARATION DES PouvoIRs
ET LA CONVENTION FtDLRALE DE 1787 (1926); BONDY, THE SEPARATION OF GOVERN-
MENTAL POWERS 17-24 (1896).
5. MASON, THE LANGUAGE OF DISSENT (1959) ; Hector, Problems of the CAB and
the Independent Regulatory Coummissions, 69 YALE L. J. 931 (1960). See Auerbach,
Some Thoughts on the Hector Memorandum, 1960 WIS. L. REV. 183; Kintner, The Cur-
rent Ordeal of the Administrative Process: In Reply to Mr. Hector, 69 YALE L. T. 965
(1960).
6. James Wilson, one of the framers of the Constitution and a justice of this
court, in one of his law lectures said that the independence of each department
required that its proceedings "should be free from the remotest influence, direct
or indirect, of either of the other two powers." ANDREWS, THE WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON (1896), vol. 1, p. 367. And the importance of such independence
was similarly recognized by Mr. Justice Story when he said that in reference
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one department do not owe their tenure to the will or preferences of per-
sons in another of the departments.7 The second essential of independence
is that officials in one department may not concurrently hold office in
either of the other two departments,' and may not usurp or encroach upon
the powers which the Constitution clearly assigns to another department
But it will be demonstrated that, in spite of the confusion in some early
decisions, this absolute prohibition on the usurpation of power of another
department does not limit the voluntary delegation by the legislature of
some functions.
The doctrine of the separation of powers is a general constitutional
principle, and it was neither conceived, nor has it ever operated, as a rigid
rule.' ° The special cases where one department performs some particular
function of another department are both explicit and implied by the very
nature of government. But the special cases are determinable and limited,
for the rule of separation of powers is meaningless if it can be circum-
vented completely. There are four categories of special cases: (1) alloca-
tion to each of the three departments of some specific powers which are
to each other neither of the departments "ought to possess, directly or indirectly,
an overruling influence in the administration of their respective powers." 1
STORY ON THE CONSTITUTION (4th ed.) § 530. To the same effect, the Federal-
ist (Madison) No. 48.
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530-31 (1933).
7. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), holds that the President
may not at his will and in violation of statute remove a member of the Federal Trade
Commission, since FTC commissioners perform other functions in addition to their
executive functions. But observe the confusion of the court on whether compensation
of judges of inferior federal courts may be diminished during their continuance in office
in violation of article III, section 1 of the Constitution. Although all such judges per-
form clearly judicial functions, the President's power of removal depends on whether
these courts have been labeled constitutional or legislative. Compare O'Donoghue v.
United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933), with Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
Effective separation of powers in England is said to date from the passage of a
statute making judges removable from office only by impeachment by Parliament for
misconduct. 12 Will. 3, c. 2 (1701). See Parker, Historic Basis of Administrative
Law: Separation of Powers and Judicial Supremacy, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 449, 450
(1958).
8. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 6.
9. The Legislature may not usurp the executive or judicial powers. Springer v.
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
The executive may not usurp the legislative or judicial powers. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) ; It re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). The
judiciary may not usurp legislative or executive powers. National City Bank v. Republic
of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955); United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S.
573, 588-89 (1948).
This is not to deny the existence of interstitial legislation by courts when the deci-
sion of a case requires them to rule which of two or more conflicting precedents shall be
applied. See CARDOZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 69 (1921), quoting from
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J.).
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 330 (Bourne ed. 1947) (Madison) ; STORY, Com-
MENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 525-27 (3rd ed. 1858);
FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 77 (1930).
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usually peculiar to one of the other departments as a checking function to
balance the powers of the other two; (2) exercise by the other departments
of minor legislative and executive functions incidental to and necessary
-for carrying on allocated constitutional power; (3) allocation of power
at the state level, as the separation of powers doctrine in the Federal
Constitution does not apply to the states; and (4) delegation by Congress
of secondary legislative functions to the other two departments. Only
the fourth special case will be examined in detail here."1
The one power under which some functions must by their very
hature be delegable to other agencies of government is the legislative
power." The legislative power is the sovereign power to make general
rules of conduct for the political community enforceable in the future by
the physical force of the state.' The legislature, though vested with this
power, is basically a duty-assigning body, since in making law it directs
the executive to do such acts as are necessary to achieve the results rq-
quired by the statute. 4 But the degree of generality in statutes varies;
controversy between factions in a legislature may cause it to choose more
general language as a compromise.' In our technically complex society,
the legislature may lack the skill to develop the detailed rules that will
carry out a general regulatory policy.'" In addition dynamic changes in
industry may make it essential that some detailed rules be under almost
11. For a detailed discussion of the first three special cases see Conant, Introduc-
tion to VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT
DAY SIGNIFICANCE at vi-Viii (1963).
12. Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions, 27 YALE L. J. 892, 897
(1918).
13. Legislation involves the creation or extinction of general classes of rights or
immunities for all persons who engage in the actions treated by the particular laws. See
Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. R. 477, 502 (N.Y. 1811) (Kent, C. J.); San Diego Land
& Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439, 440 (1903) (Holmes, J.); Prentise v. Atlantic
Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) (Holmes, J.). See Weeks, Legislative Power
versus Delegated Legislative Power, 25 GFo. L. J. 314, 317-22 (1937) ; Green, Separation
of Governmental Powers, 29 YALE L. J. 369, 373 (1920) ; Akzin, Tie Concept of Legis-
lation, 21 IowA L. REv. 713, 734 (1936); ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 409 (6th ed.
1958).
14. Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 524, 610 (1838).
15. See Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 501, 522
(1948) ; Miller, Statutory Language and the Purposive Use of Am1biguity, 42 VA. L.
REv. 23 (1956).
16. Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, and
from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive officers the
duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute. To deny the power
of Congress to delegate such a duty would, in effect, amount but to declaring
that the plenary power vested in Congress to regulate foreign commerce could
not be efficaciously exerted.
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904). See GOODN0W, PRINCIPLES OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 324 (1905) ; FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMER-
ICAN LEGISLATION 301 (1917) ; Rosenberry, Administrative Law and the Constitution, 23
Am. PoL. Sci. Rxv. 32, 35 (1929).
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constant change." To the extent that the legislature leaves for the execu-
tive the making of detailed secondary rules in enforcing a statute, there
is necessarily a delegation of some legislative functions, and it can be
argued that the Constitution gives Congress explicit authority to make
such secondary delegations. 8
Before turning to the constitutional aspects, it should be noted that
the analogies from agency law do not apply to the constitutional vesting
of the sovereign coercive power of government in the legislature, execu-
tive and judiciary. The people as electors are not principals, delegating
authority to government to do acts they could do themselves. Governing
one another is something which they could not do themselves, without
government. Congressmen are not agents; they are not bound to follow
directions from any single elector or group of electors. Their power is
sufficient to pass laws that force many electors to do acts which those
electors do not wish to do. For these reasons, this ancient agency maxim
prohibiting the unauthorized subdelegation of agency power has no appli-
cation to the election of legislatures and their delegation of rule making
functions to administrative agencies.2"
The vesting of sovereign legislative power in a legislature is more
closely analogous to the creation of a trust in those persons elected to
office. For, in a democracy, it is a public trust to govern by use of the
state's monopoly on the physical force of organized society for the bene-
fit of the society as a whole.2 ' Following the trust analogy it is signif-
icant that a trustee may not delegate his general discretionary powers to
17. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 404-06 (1929), hold-
ing that a delegation of power to the President to adjust tariffs to equalize costs of
production is constitutional.
18. "The Congress shall have the power . . . to make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
19. Compare LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 141 (1690).
20. See Duff & Vhiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of
American Constitutional Law, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 168 (1929).
21. Locke, who was a Chancery secretary, emphasized that the relationship of the
legislature to the governed was not one of contract, but in the nature of a legal trust,
a primary fiduciary relationship. LOCKE, op. cit. supra note 19, 88 149, 156, 221, 222,
240. See GOUGH, LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 136-71 (1950) ; Taylor & Marshall v.
Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577 (1900) ; Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 450 (1875) ; Conley v.
State, 46 Neb. 187, 64 N.W. 708, 710 (1895) ; Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Co., 8 N.J.
433, 86 A.2d 201, 221 (1952) ; Prescott v. Ferris, 251 App. Div. 113, 295 N.Y. Supp. 818,
825 (1937); I2 re Corliss, 11 R.I. 638, 642 (1876); MECHEm, PUBLIC OFFICERS § 16
(1890).
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an agent.22 However, as long as he retains the full responsibility, he
may employ agents where reasonably necessary to carry out his duties
.and especially for matters in which he is not experienced.23
There is a clear application of these rules in democratic govern-
ment. In our Constitution, the people have vested the legislative power
in the Congress and have thus given it the primary lawmaking task. "'
Surely this will forbid the delegation by Congress to the executive or
judiciary of the authority to exercise its entire legislative power or its
entire power over any particular subject matter. Such unlimited delega-
tion would reallocate the constitutional distribution of governmental
powers,25 and the legislature has not been given the constitutional power
by itself to amend the constitution. 6
The separation of powers into three independent branches thus
incorporates a constitutional mandate to Congress that it alone may
exercise the plenary legislative power in the sense that only Congress
may adopt the primary rules of conduct for the nation. But this does
not preclude the voluntary delegation by the Congress to the executive
of the secondary or subsidiary rule making functions.27 Hence the
agency analogy seems to have force here. A principal, in delegating
specific contracting authority to his agent to act in a representative
capacity for him, does not lose any of his own power to contract. He
may intervene in the negotiations carried on by his agent, give special
directions to the agent for the making of particular contracts,2s or
22. Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. Colby, 108 F.2d 743, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ;
Meck v. Behrens, 141 Wash. 676, 252 Pac. 91 (1927) ; 2 Scorr, TRUSTS § 171.1 (2d ed.
1956).
23. See In re Whipple's Estate, 19 N.Y.S.2d 105, 110 (Surr. Ct. 1940) ; In re
Barnes' Estates, 339 Pa. 88, 14 A.2d 274, 276 (1940) ; Ewing v. Foley, 115 Tex. 222, 280
S.W. 499, 500 (1926) ; Ex parte Belchier, 27 Eng. Rep. 144 (1754) ; 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS
§ 171.2 (2d ed. 1956).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
25. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935). "Congress cannot delegate
any part of its legislative power except under the limitations of a prescribed standard."
United States v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R.R., 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931).
26. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 107 (1952) ; Feely v. Sid-
ney S. Schupper Interstate Hauling System Inc., 72 F. Supp. 663, 667 (D. Md. 1947).
27. "That the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is, of course,
clear. But Congress may declare its will, and, after fixing a primary standard, devolve
upon administrative officers the 'power to fill up the details' by prescribing administra-
tive rules and regulations." United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287
U.S. 77, 85 (1932).
28. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Martin-Lebreton Ins. Agency, 242 F.2d 951
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 870 (1957) ; Shrewsbury v. Dupont Nat'l Bank, 10 F.2d
632, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1925); Guggisberg v. Otsego County Co-op. Ass'n, 258 Mich. 553,
242 N.W.2d 749, 750 (1932).
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terminate the representative authority of his agent at will.20
Similarly, having exercised its constitutional power and duty to
make the primary rules of conduct for the state, the legislature may
delegate some of its functions by creating a partial agency in an execu-
tive department or administrative commission to make the more detail-
ed secondary rules."0  The statute which states the primary rules-the
standards for regulatory control-in effect also states the scope of the
partial agency.3 The legislature retains the power, by amending or
repealing the statute which created the agency, to change the agency's
authority to make the secondary rules or to revoke the agency.32 The
legislature's sovereign law-making power, which includes plenary powers
of control over administrative structure and procedure, is thus unimpair-
ed by the delegation of secondary legislative functions.
It is significant that, in spite of the past and present confusion of
many judges and scholars, the above rule of non-delegable legislative
power but delegable secondary legislative functions has always been our
law. 3  Madison explained this when commenting on Montesquieu's
interpretation of the meaning of separation of powers in the English
Constitution.34
[I]t may clearly be inferred that, in saying "There can be no
liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in
29. Shawver v. Ewing, 1 F.2d 423, 425 (8th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 601
(1925) ; Elevator Operators' Union v. Newman, 30 Cal. 2d 799, 186 P.2d 1 (1947) ; Wil-
son Sullivan Co. v. International Paper Makers Realty Corp., 307 N.Y. 20, 119 N.E.2d
573, 574 (1954). See MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 262 (4th ed. 1952).
30. "Necessity therefore fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable and im-
practicable to compel Congress to prescribe detailed rules; it then becomes constitution-
ally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which
is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority." American Power & Light
Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946). See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 Fed. 307,
312 (7th Cir. 1919).
31. "The only authority conferred, or which could be conferred, by statute is to
make regulations to carry out the purposes of the act-not to amend it." Miller v.
United States, 294 U.S. 435, 440 (1935). "The Secretary of the Treasury is bound by
law; and although, in the exercise of his discretion, he may adopt necessary forms and
modes of giving effect to the law; yet, neither he nor those who act under him, can
dispense with, or alter, any of its provisions." Tracy v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. (35 U.S.)
80, 95 (1836).
32. "[A] change of law pending an administrative hearing must be followed in
relation to permits for future acts. Otherwise the administrative body would issue
orders contrary to the existing legislation." Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 U.S.
73, 78 (1943). See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 296 (1958); Stark v.
Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) ; Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power
I, 47 COLUm. L. REV. 359, 366 (1947).
33. COaMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL ADmINISTRATIvE AUTHORITIES
121 (1927).
34. THE FEDELIST No. 47, at 331 (Bourne ed. 1947) (Madison); see also LANDIS,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10 (1938).
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the same person, or body of magistrates," or, "if the power of
judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers," he did not mean that these departments ought to have
no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other.
His meaning as his own words import, and still more conclu-
sively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to
no more than this, that where the whole power of one depart-
ment is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole
power of another department, the fundamental principles of a
free constitution are subverted. -
The first Congress realized the necessity of delegating secondary
legislative functions, because it did so in three statutes, two pertaining
to customs and a third to pensions. 5 The Supreme Court in two early
cases upheld the constitutionality of two statutes delegating contingent
legislative functions to the President." In Wayinan v. Southard," the
issue was whether Congress could delegate legislative functions to fed-
eral courts under its power over court procedure. In upholding the
delegation, Chief Justice Marshall said :
But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which
the legislature may rightfully exercise itself .... The line has
not been exactly drawn which separates those important sub-
jects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,
from those of less interest, in which a general provision may
be made, and power given to those who are to act under such
general provisions, to fill up the details.
Many state legislatures, in dealing with the separation of powers
in state constitutions, early showed an understanding of the delegation
problem. In a leading case, the Illinois legislature had delegated to the
majority of voters in an area the authority to apprQve formation of new
counties. The Illinois Supreme Court approved the delegation of this
secondary function as follows :
35. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADIINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE 8 (1941) (hereinafter referred to as ADMINISTRArIVE PRoC. REP.) See dis-
cussion in Cole, Administrative Agencies and Judicial Powers, 44 A.B.A.J. 953 (1958).
See history of federal delegation of legislative function in COMER, op. cit. supra note 33,
at 50-111.
36. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 19 (1825); The Brig Aurora v. United
States, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 382 (1813).
37. 10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 1 (1825).
38. Id. at 41.
39. People v. Reynolds, 10 Ill. 1, 13, 19-20 (1848). See discussion of other early
cases in Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power II, 47 COLUM. L. Rav.
561, 581-92 (1947); Cheadle, supra note 12, at 901-18. Of special interest are In re
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We see, then, that while the legislature may not divest itself
of its proper functions, or delegate its general legislative
authority, it may still authorize others to do those things which
it might properly, yet cannot understandingly or advantageous-
ly do itself. Without this power legislation would become op-
pressive, and yet imbecile .... [T]he legislature may delegate
authority, either to individuals or to bodies of people, to do
many important legislative acts, .. . but in doing this it does
not divest itself of any of its original powers. It still possesses
all the authority it ever had. It is still the repository of the
legislative power of the State.
On the federal level, the Supreme Court has made unqualified
statements that Congress may not delegate its legislative power,4" but
these statements must be interpreted to mean that Congress may not
abdicate its constitutional duties by delegating its plenary legislative
power over any given subject matter. For, no delegation of secondary
legislative functions by the Congress was held unconstitutional before
1935."' In Buttfield v. Stranahan, the Court approved a delegation of
rule making power by Congress to the Secretary of the Treasury to set
standards for tea to control its importation.42 Approval was given to
similar broad delegations to the Secretary of War to determine unrea-
sonable obstructions to navigation,4 to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission to regulate safety appliances,44 carriers' accounting systems,45
and rate discriminations, 0 and to the Secretary of the Treasury to
administer the federal income tax." The more recent Supreme Court
opinions clearly indicate that broad delegations of secondary legislative
functions are in conformity with a plenary legislative power vested in
Congress.4" If the statute containing the delegation has intelligible
Griner, 16 Wis. 423, 433-38 (1863), holding constitutional a delegation by Congress to
the President of the power to make rules under a military draft law; Locke's Appeal,
72 Pa. 491 (1873), upholding delegation in local option law; and Georgia R.R. v. Smith,
70 Ga. 694 (1883), upholding legislative delegation to public service commission of
power to fix rates.
40. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-93 (1892). In this case the Supreme Court
held a delegation of authority to the President to suspend provisions of a tariff act
constitutional.
41. 1 DAvIs, ADMlIxisTRATIvE LAW TRATIsE § 2.06 (1958).
42. See note 16 supra.
43. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907).
44. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281 (1908).
45. ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194 (1912).
46 United States v. Atchison, T. & S.F.Ry., 234 U.S. 476 (1914).
47. Brushaker v. Union P. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
48. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423-27 (1944), and cases cited there-
in; Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 146 (1941) ; Parker, Separa-
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standards so that the courts can determine that Congress has exercised
the primary legislative power on the subject matter, the delegation of
secondary legislative functions is constitutional.49
III. LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION IN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES:
SOME PROCEDURAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Administrative legislation, the secondary legislative function of
administrative agencies, includes both rule making"0 and rate making.5
The enabling statute may expressly or impliedly"2 delegate to an agency
the authority to make legislative rules. 3  In making such rules, the
agency utilizes its expertise to assist the legislature in delineating a code
of required conduct, and the courts value such delineations when con-
struing a statute. 4 If administrative rules are within the scope of the
enabling statute, have a rational relation to the ends of the statute, and
are issued pursuant to proper procedural requirements, they have the
force of law. 5 Once the regulations are adopted and become part of
tion of Powers Revisited, 49 MICH. L. REV. 1009, 1020-28 (1951).
49. "The adoption of the declared policy -by Congress and its definition of the
circumstances in which its command is to be effective, constitute the performance, in the
constitutional sense, of the legislative function." Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator,
312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941). See Lichter v. United States, 344 U.S. 742, 784-86 (1948).
See generally Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies, The Need for Definition
of Standards, 75 HARv. L. REv. 863, 1055, 1263 (1962).
50. "Rule" means the whole or any part of any agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe
law or policy or to describe the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of
any agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages,
corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances,
services or allowances therefor or of valuations costs, or accounting, or practices bearing
on any of the foregoing. "Rule making" means agency process for the formulation,
amendment, or repeal of a rule. Administrative Procedure Act § 2(c), 60 Stat. 237
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1958). See Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676,
693 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
51. Rate making, in prescribing a rule of conduct for the future, is clearly legisla-
tive. United States v. Jones, 336 U.S. 641, 652 (1949) ; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 38, 50 (1936) ; Arizona Grocery v. Atchison, T. & S.F.Ry., 284
U.S. 370, 387 (1932); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
For a definition of the legislative function see note 13 supra and accompanying text.
52. United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. (34 U.S.) 238, 254-55 (1835).
53. Legislative rules are distinguished from interpretive rules, which are narrower
in scope and more subject to reversal on review, since they merely define the terms of
the enabling statute. Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
See 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE §§ 503-04 (1958) ; COAIER, op. cit. supra
note 33, at 137-69; Parker, Administrative Interpretations, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 533 (1951).
54. See Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 523 (1942); Bay Ridge Operating
Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 461 (1948) ; FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS
AND PROPERTY 213-23 (1928); BLACHLY & OATMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATION AND
ADJUDICATION 43-53 (1934).
55. Public Utils. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 542 (1958); Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937) ; United States v. Michigan Port-
land Cement Co., 270 U.S. 521, 525 (1926). See Parker, Federal Administrative Regn-
lations: A General Survey, 6 MIAmI L. Q. 324, 354 (1952).
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the law, the same presumptions attach to them as to statutes. The re-
buttable presumption in favor of their validity with the burden of proof
on one who challenges them results in widespread, voluntary conform-
ance to their mandate." Thus, the rules perform the vital legislative
function in a democratic society of informing the public beforehand of
what specific classes of actions are approved and forbidden."
The varying circumstances under which regulations are prescribed
by administrative agencies affect the way in which administrative dis-
cretion is exercised." For example, an administrative agency engaged
in economic regulation usually has substantial discretion in adopting
rules to carry out its assigned tasks. 9 Under constitutional theory, the
basic substantive constraint on administrative discretion is that the rules
which are adopted must conform to the standards and limits of the
enabling statute. Following the analogy of agency law, the rule making
must be within the actual authority delegated to the administrative
agency by the legislature. Any attempt by an agency to make a rule
which exceeds the scope of the enabling statute is ultra vires and void.6"
Such rule would also be unconstitutional as an attempt by an adminis-
trative agency to exercise the legislative power, which under our con-
stitutions is vested entirely in the legislature.6' Moreover, an adminis-
trative agency may not substitute its own regulatory standards for those
56. See Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86, 101 (1949) ; Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 179 F.2d 896, 902 (Sth Cir. 1949). Compare earlier comments of
Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion, 47 YALE L. J. 577, 600 (1938).
57. For a discussion of antecedent publicity under section 4 of the Administrative
Procedure Act see Schwartz, Administrative Procedure and the A.P.A., 24 N.Y.U.L. REv.
514-21 (1949) ; Schwartz, The Administrative Procedure Act in Operation, 29 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1173, 1189-1200 (1954).
58. Professor Fuchs lists: (1) the character of the parties affected, (2) the
nature of the problem to be dealt with, (3) the character of the administrative deter-
mination, (4) the type of agency issuing the rule and (5) the character of enforcement
which attaches to the resulting regulation. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-
Making, 52 HARv. L. REv. 259, 266 (1938). See examples id. 273-80; Fairlie, Adminis-
trative Legislation, 18 MIcH. L. Rav. 181, 183-88 (1920).
59. NLRB v. Efco Mfg., Inc., 203 F.2d 458, 459 (1st Cir. 1953); Ward v. FCC,
108 F.2d 486, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1939). See Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American
Administrative Law Theory, 47 YALE L. J. 538, 544-46 (1938) ; Pound, Tire Adnrinrstra-
five Application of Legal Standards, 44 A.B.A. REP. 445 (1919).
60. FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954); Manhattan
General Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 559 (1936) ; Northern Natural Gas Co. v.
O'Malley, 277 F.2d 128, 134-35 (8th Cir. 1960). See note 31 supra. For application of
the concept of ultra vires to allegedly unauthorized administrative rule making see Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223 (1943).
61. International Ry. v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506, 514 (1922); Gardner v. Ewing,
88 F. Supp. 315, 321 (W.D. Ohio), aff'd, 185 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1950), reversed as to
costs, 341 U.S. 321 (1951).
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stated in a statute.6 2 Regulations may not curtail the scope of statutory
exemptions" or expand statutory prohibitions;64 nor may they, without
authority, extend or modify statutory provisions. 5 Thus, the theory is
that the statute sets the channels or limits within which administrative
discretion may operate, and an administrative rule may not narrow,
widen or divert those channels, but must operate within them.
In actual practice, the division in legislative functions between
legislatures and administrative agencies is not nearly so clear. As Pro-
fessor Davis has shown, Congress has made many delegations of legis-
lative functions to administrative agencies without any intelligible
standards, and the courts have upheld these delegations.66 As a result,
in these instances administrative agencies make major policy determina-
tions without proper legislative guidance. This almost unlimited admin-
istrative discretion in rule making is well illustrated by the power of
public utility commissions to set rates under a statutory standard of
"just and reasonable." As long as there is some rational basis for its
decision, the regulatory commission is delegated broad discretion con-
cerning the weight to be given each of the relevant, underlying economic
factors.67 As another example, the ambiguous and amorphous standards
of the Interstate Commerce Act permitted the Commission to set mini-
mum railroad rates which channeled traffic away from lower cost rail-
roads to higher cost truck transport, thus wasting the nation's resources
on over investment in trucks while railroad capacity remained under-
used." The fault in these instances is not primarily that of the admin-
istrative agencies, which are not empowered to decline all authority
because of vague enabling statutes. Rather the fault lies with the
legislatures which fail in their constitutional duty to adopt meaningful
62. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958) ; Merritt v. Walsh, 104 U.S. 694,
704 (1881).
63. Morrill v. Jones, 106 U.S. 466 (1883).
64. Colgate-Palmolive Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355, 363 (1949); Lynch v.
Tilden Produce Co., 265 U.S. 315, 321 (1924) ; Teal v. Felton, 12 How. (37 U.S.) 284,
291 (1851).
65. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 U.S. 607, 618-19 (1944) ; Koshland
v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446-47 (1936) ; Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 440
(1935) ; Campbell v. Galeno Chem. Co., 281 U.S. 599, 610 (1930) ; Williamson v. United
States, 207 U.S. 425, 462 (1908).
66. 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.04 (1958).
67. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602-03 (1944); Hale, Utility
Regulation in Light of the Hope Natural Gas Case, 44 COLUm. L. REV. 488 (1944) ;
Freund, The Right to Judicial Review in Rate Controversies, 27 W. VA. L. REv. 205
(1921).
68. See WILLIAOS, THE REGULATION OF RAIL-MOTOR RATE COmPETITION 228
(1958) ; Baumol, The Role of Cost in the Minimum Pricing of Railroad Services, 35 J.
Bus. U. Cmi. 1 (1962). Hearings on Problems of the Railroads Before The Senate
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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standards in enabling statutes and with the courts which fail to force
legislatures to be rigorous by not declaring vague enabling statutes un-
constitutional. Professor Davis favors such unguided discretion in
administrative agencies, believing they are many times more capable of
making general legislative policy than is the legislature. 9 Those who
prefer that private political pressures be centered on elected legislators
rather than appointed administrators reject this outright violation of the
principle of separation of powers.
Legislative due process is the main constitutional requirement of
administrative rule making. Since legislative action deals with classes
of rights rather than the treatment of individuals, its due process re-
quirements are different from executive or judicial due process. In
addition to the constitutional procedures required to enact a statute, the
elements of legislative due process include the power to act on the sub-
ject matter,7" a constitutional objective or purpose,7' and a means which
has a rational and substantial relation to the objective. 2 In addition a
statute must not be discriminatory,73 and it must have certainty or
definiteness.7"
These established principles of legislative due process for statutes
also are applicable to rules made by administrative agencies. As noted
above, the power of an administrative agency to make rules on a subject
matter is derived from the enabling statute. Acting beyond that power
would violate due process in the sense that unconstitutional assumption
of legislative power by an executive agency is an unauthorized proced-
69. DAvis, op. cit. supra note 66, § 2.05.
70. Power of a legislature to act on a subject matter is determined by the constitu-
tions which create or limit its authority. Attempts to exceed that constituionally defined
power violate due process. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 106-07
(1952).
71. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954), as later supplemented in
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ; Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297
U.S. 189, 198 (1936) ; Meyer v. State, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400, 403 (1923).
72. An arbitrary or capricious means may not be adopted to effect a constitutional
objective. Butler v. State, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957) (prohibiting sales to adults of
books found unfit for children not rationally related to objective of protecting youth) ;
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943) (possession of firearms not rationally
converted to presumption that they were transported in interstate commerce) ; Pierce v.
Society of the Sisters of Holy Name, 268 U.S. 469, 534 (1925) (prohibiting private
schools not rationally related to objective of compulsory education).
73. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), as later supplemented in Brown
v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917);
Berman v. Board of Educ., 360 Ill. 535, 196 N.E. 464, 468 (1935).
74. A vague and indefinite statute violates due process. United States v. Cardiff,
344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952) ; Winters v. People, 333 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1948) ; Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) ; Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926) ; A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233, 238-39 (1925);
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89-91 (1921).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ural action. The objective or purpose of an administrative rule also
must be found in the enabling statute, since it is the constitutional duty
of the legislature to exercise the primary rule making function. Conse-
quently, the key problems of legislative due process as applied to admin-
istrative rule making center on whether there is a rational and substan-
tial relation between the rules adopted and the purpose stated in the
enabling statute. If there is no rational relation between the admin-
istrative rules and the statutory objective, the rules are arbitrary and a
denial of due process."m Administrative regulations also must be non-
discriminatory,"6 and they must not be vague or uncertain."
It is significant that legislative due process does not require hear-
ings"8 or findings" before an administrative agency adopts a rule or
regulation. Some enabling statutes, however, do impose the formal,
time-consuming requirement of a hearing on rule making." Section 4
of the Administrative Procedure Act requires only publication of notice
in the Federal Register before rules are made.8 Those affected by the
proposed rule are thus able to make their views known to the adminis-
trative agency and, though no formal method of submitting such views
is established, Section 4 permits more opportunity for expression than
Congress or state legislatures must provide when enacting statutes.8 2
If the expertise of officials in making administrative rules is for the
75. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 69-73 (1937) ; Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 530 (1934) ; Landsden v. Hart, 168 F.2d 409, 412 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 858 (1948) ; Smith v. Sutton, 135 F. Supp. 805, 806 (D.D.C. 1955) ;
Pyeatte v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 102 F. Supp. 407, 415 (W.D. Okla.),
aff'd, 342 U.S. 936 (1952) ; Kindlay v. Board of Supervisors, 72 Ariz. 58, 230 P.2d 526,
531 (1951).
76. Epley v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 1020, 1022 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Inland Steel Co.
v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 9, 19 (7th Cir. 1940).
77. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952) ; compare trial court and Supreme Court opinions in
Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners' Conference, 104 F. Supp. 734, 740 (D.D.C.),
aff'd, 202 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1952), rev'd, 345 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1953). See American
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 247 (1936); Northwest Steel Rolling
Mills v. Kendall, 210 F.2d 283 (Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954).
78. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519 (1944) ; Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915); Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d
676, 694 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949) ; Jordan v. American Eagle Fire
Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281, 287-88 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; Schwartz, Procedural Due Process in
Federal Administrative Law, 25 N.Y.U.L. REv. 552, 558-66 (1950).
79. Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935) ; Logans-
port Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
80. See,.e.g., the Interstate Commerce Act § 17, 24 Stat. 385 (1887), 49 U.S.C. §
17 (1958); ADM INISTRATIVE PRoc. REP. 105; ScuwARTz, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERI-
CAN ADMIxNISTRATIVE LAw 63-68 (1958).
81. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958).
82. Schwartz, The Administrative Procedure Act in Operatioa, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rxv.
1173, 1194 (1954).
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regulation of economic and other activities in the public interest, those
immediately affected should have no special procedural rights to inter-
fere with or to influence the rule makers. Those who are to be regu-
lated are unlikely to exert a benefit to the public interest by their
influence on legislation.
The one other constitutional limitation on administrative legislation
which must be noted is the eminent domain limit to rate making. Since
no business firm has a constitutional right to a monopoly profit, all
prices may be regulated in the public interest." The lower limit on rates
which may be set before eminent domain applies is not clear from the
decisions.8" The Supreme Court has held, however, that railroads may
be required to carry some commodities at noncompensatory rates so long
as rates as a whole afford just compensation.85 The eminent domain pro-
tection against confiscatory rate regulation is interrelated with the due
process protection, for confiscatory rates are also arbitrary because they
are not rationally related to a statutory objective of "just and reasonable
charges.""0 Consequently, many of the decisions do not clearly distin-
guish which of these two protections is controlling when ruling on the
constitutionality of particular rates."
IV. EXECUTIVE FUNCTION IN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
A. The Nature of the Executive Function
The executive or purely administrative functions of administrative
agencies constitute the bulk of their tasks.88 The expertise and effi-
ciency which specialized agencies develop in performing the regulatory
tasks are the reasons for their creation and for their being termed
administrative."9
The executive or administrative function is the power to perform
all acts necessary and appropriate to applying or enforcing statutes and
83. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934). See also Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113, 130 (1876).
84. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 595-96 (1915) ; Simp-
son v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352, 434-35 (1913) ; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154
U.S. 362 (1894).
85. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 345 U.S. 146, 150 (1953).
86. See Interstate Commerce Act § 1(5), 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 1(5)
(1958).
87. See, e.g., cases in note 84 supra; HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW 467 (1952).
88. ADMNISTRATIvE Proc. REP. 35.
89. This section will treat only regulatory agencies and will not discuss the internal
management problems of government, such as government-employee relations and gov-
ernment contracts.
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administrative rules, other than clearly judicial functions."0 An un-
fortunate and misleading dichotomy in classification of the cases"' and
in the Administrative Procedure Act92 resulted in most executive actions
of administrative agencies being erroneously classified as part of ad-
judication. As a result of this misleading failure to distinguish ad-
ministrative from judicial types of activities, many unnecessarily formal
and extended judicial procedures have been required in statutes assign-
ing executive functions to agencies.9" Professor Gellhorn has noted
that judicial hearings, for example, are neither necessary nor efficient
for execution of most purely administrative functions. 4
A most important and valuable characteristic of purely administra-
tive functions is that, unlike judicial proceedings, there is no constitu-
tional limitation on the method of executing them other than that the
method must not be arbitrary or discriminatory." In an enabling
statute, the legislature may design a method for execution of the statu-
tory objective or delegate this authority to an administrative agency.
In either case, managerial efficiency can be the key criteria for the
method adopted. Thus, the second large area of discretion delegated to
administrative agencies (rule making being the first) is in the exercise
of the purely administrative function-including enabling actions, di-
90. See Mitchell Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 230 U.S. 247, 273 (1913) (Pitney,
J.); Stahlman v. FCC, 126 F.2d 124, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Morgan v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 115 F.2d 990, 993-94 (6th Cir., 1940) ; Application of Texas Co., 27 F. Supp.
847, 849 (E.D. Ill. 1939) ; Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L.
REv. 614, 615 (1927). For a definition of the judicial function see note 129 infra and
accompanying text.
91. Activities of administrative agencies have been classified either as rule making
or adjudication. Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
92. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, "the definition of adjudication is
largely a residual one, i.e., 'other than rule making but including licensing.'" U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADIMIINISTRATIVE PROcEDURE ACT 13
(1947). An entire volume purporting to deal with the judicial function but which makes
no clear distinction between executive and judicial actions is CHAMBERLIN, DOWLING &
HAYS, THE JuDIcIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942).
93. Elias, Administrative Discretion-No Solution in Sight, 45 MARQ. L. REV. 313,
336 (1962). The formal adjudicatory procedures of sections 5, 7 and 8 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act apply only where some other statute requires agency action "on
the second after opportunity for an agency hearing." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, op. cit.
supra note 92, at 41.
94. Gellhorn, Administrative Procedure Reform: .Uardy Perennial, 48 A.B.A.J.
243 (1962). See GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 61 (1941).
95. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 317 U.S. 80, 94-95 (1943) ; Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan
I. Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 580-81 (1940) ; Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros.
Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 275-77 (1933) ; North Cent. Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
265 F.2d 581, 584-85 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 903 (1959) ; it re Standard Gas
& Elec. Co., 151 F.2d 326, 331 (6th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 796 (1946) ; Dow
v. Icker, 123 F.2d 909, 913, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
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rective actions and ministerial duties.9  A review of this function in
some state and federal regulatory agencies will illustrate the problem
of administrative efficiency.
Issuance of licenses. Many common-law rights to engage in par-
ticular activities have been abolished by statute. They have been re-
placed by privileges to acquire limited rights through securing a license
or permission from an administrative agency of the state.97 Among
these are use of public lands, waterways, highways and airways, entrance
into many businesses and professions and the sale of securities. In
order to receive a license, an applicant must demonstrate to an admit-
istrative officer that he fulfills the statutory and regulatory prerequi-
sites. Thus, administrative licensing pursuant to statute is an exercise
of the police power of the state to protect the public health, morals, or
welfare."8 Since the granting of a license creates a legal right which
did not previously exist in the applicant to engage in an activity which
is otherwise prohibited by law, the issuance of individual licenses by an
administrative agency is clearly an executive function. "
Regulatory licenses are of two main types: (1) those which are
issued in unlimited numbers to all qualified applicants, and (2) those
which are issued only in limited numbers and which restrict entry even
96. ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 72-73 (1945); NLRB v. White Constr. & Eng'r
Co., 204 F.2d 950, 952 (5th Cir. 1953). "Administrative discretion is the freedom of
choice or judgment with which an executive officer or an administrative agency is en-
trusted in order to insure the constant and complete effectuation of the legislative policy
in any situation which might arise in connection with the enforcement of the statute."
Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion, 47 YALE L. J. 577, 581 (1938).
See Patterson, Ministerial and Discretionary Official Acts, 20 MicH. L. REv. 848 (1922).
97. "The word 'license' means permission or authority; and a license to do a par-
ticular thing is a permission or authority to do that thing; and if granted by a person
having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports
to authorize. It certainly transfers to him all the right which the grantor can transfer,
to do what is within the terms of the license." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.)
1, 213-14 (1824). See Same v. Street Comm'rs, 307 Mass. 495, 30 N.E.2d 380, 381-82
(1940) ; Bloomfield v. State, 86 Ohio St. 253, 99 N.E. 309, 310 (1912) ; Barnett, Public
Licenses and Private Rights, 33 ORE. L. REv. 1 (1953).
98. Thurlow v. Rhode Island, 5 How. (46 U.S.) 504, 589 (1847) (McLean, J.);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 663 (1887) ; Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean,
301 U.S. 412, 425-26 (1937); Ancel & Siegel, Licensing as a Regulatory Device, 1957
U. IL. L.F. 61.
99. Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 467 (1930) ; Gouge
v. David, 185 Ore. 437, 202 P.2d 489, 495 (1949). Although the legislature could issue
individual business professional licenses itself, when it chooses to pass an enabling
statute delegating to an administrative agency the authority to issue licenses pursuant to
a stated standard, the function becomes executive. See 1 BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATMv
ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 68 (1942); Rock Island Motor Transp. Co.
v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 239 Minn. 284, 58 N.W.2d 723, 727 (1953). For a
carefully reasoned opinion indicating why the issuance of licenses is not judicial see
Cromwell v. Jackson, 188 Md. 8, 52 A.2d 79 (1947). See also Household Fin. Corp. v.
State, 40 Wash.2d 451, 244 P.2d 260, 263 (1952).
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though the qualified applicants are in excess of the established quota.
The first category includes, for example, licenses for automobiles, driv-
ers, fishing, to sell or issue securities, to enter the professions, or to
engage in most businesses. 0' The key administrative problem for these
licenses is creation and control of an examing board which will set up
reasonable standards for admission to the particular activity. These
standards must not create undue barriers to entry nor may they be dis-
criminatory.'
Licenses of the second type may be designed to effect a public
policy of restricting entry, such as those for selling intoxicating liquors
or operating taxicabs." 2 Or they may be limited in numbers by physical
constraints, such as the number of channels available for radio and
television."' 3  In either case, the license becomes a scarce resource-an
opportunity to make a monopoly profit for which people will bid in the
market. In a free society there is only one rational, nondiscriminatory
way to allocate a scarce resource among equally qualified bidders-the
public auction. After adopting detailed rules on qualifications for and
licensee's use of any scarce license, the administrative agency should
then sell the license to the highest qualified bidder."' The rights or
privileges arising from scarce licenses are in the nature of public prop-
erty, and if they have a money value, they should not be given away.
Any purely administrative (non-monetary) method of allocation among
equally qualified bidders is likely to be based on political influence of
100. State agencies have license control over 75 occupations requiring skill and
training. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLATION IN
THE STATES 7-8 (1952). See Clark, Occupational Licensing in the Building Industry,
1952 WAsa. U.L.Q. 483; Noie, Restriction of Freedom of Entry into the Building
Trades, 38 IOWA L. REV. 556 (1953).
101. See Gellhorn, Occupational Licensing-A Nationwide Dilemma, J. ACCOUNT-
ANCY, Jan. 1960, p. 39. On the problem of licensing and permits to issue securities see 1
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 265-316 (2d ed. 1961); Loss & COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW
87-95 (1958).
102. See Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 F.2d 96, 100 (6th Cir.
1947) ; Schreiber v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 12 Ill.2d 118, 145 N.E.2d 50, 52
(1957) ; Stouffer Corp. v. Board of Liquor Control, 165 Ohio St. 96, 133 N.E.2d 325, 327
(1956).
103. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940). See Schwartz,
Comparative Television and the Chancellor's Foot, 47 GEO. LJ. 655 (1959) ; Note, 23 U.
PITT. L. REV. 157 (1961).
104. If preservation of competition or prevention of monopoly is one of the statu-
tory criteria in issuing particular types of licenses (such as television channels), the
statute or administrative rule may make the firm or group holding one license un-
qualified to bid on another. See, e.g., the Communications Act § 314, 48 Stat. 1087
(1934), 47 U.S.C. § 314 (1958); Schwartz, Antitrust and the FCC: The Problem of
Network Dominance, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 753, 766 (1959) ; Hale & Hale, Competition on
Control II: Radio and Television Broadcasting, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 585 (1959) ; Friend-
ly, The Federal Administrative Ageiwies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards,
75 HARv. L. REv. 1055-72 (1962).
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applicants 0" or on alleged material facts which are really trivia. 06
Dispensing public benefits. Dispensing actions of administrative
agencies involve the distribution of public benefits, either in money or
in sanctioning a deviation from established laws or administrative regu-
lations.0 7 Examples are the award of veterans benefits,0 ' a zoning
board permit for zoning variances,' and permission by utility commis-
sions for firms to discontinue particular services or to consolidate when
such an approval creates a statutory exemption from the antitrust
laws."0 Actions of the Interstate Commerce Commission in allowing
particular rate reductions or increases on a single commodity to the sole
carrier on a route are borderline cases between rule making and admin-
istrative dispensation.
The exercise of administrative discretion in dispensing public bene-
fits is greater than it is in most types of licensing. Each dispensation
case involves a unique fact situation which the proponent argues is
sufficient for creating an exception to general law. The possibilities
of confused issues, bias, discrimination and even ultra vires action are
very great."' Two legislative controls are needed for effective judicial
review of alleged arbitrary abuse of such broad discretion: (1) a set of
statutory standards which indicate at least in some general way which of
the standards are of prime importance and should be given the greatest
105. See Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224
(D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Massachusetts Bay Telecasters v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55, 65-67 (D.C. Cir.
1958). For report on influence in the case of Television Channel 10 in Miami see 17
PlxE & FISCHER, RADIO REGULATION 1001 (1958); H.R. Doc. No. 2711, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1959) ; Note, Ex parte Contacts with the Federal Co nonunicationis Commission,
73 HARv. L. REv. 1178 (1960).
106. In one case of rival applicants for television channels, the toilet facilities of
studios were urged as a material basis for decision. Elias, supra note 93, at 336.
107. Freund, supra note 54, at 128.
108. Veterans benefits are gratuities and establish no vested rights in the recipient.
Slocumb v. Gray, 179 F.2d 31, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Van Home v. Hines, 122 F.2d 207,
209 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 689 (1941).
109. Zoning Board action in permitting variances is a purely administrative func-
tion. Johnston v. Board of Supervisors, 31 Cal. 2d 66, 73, 187 P.2d 686, 691 (1947) ;
Lee v. Board of Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 37 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1946) ; Falvo v. Kerner,
222 App. Div. 289, 225 N.Y. Supp. 747, 749 (1927) ; Board of Adjustment v. Stovall, 147
Tex. 366, 216 S.W.2d 171, 173-74 (1949).
110. Railroad abandonments are administrative questions within the discretion of
the Interstate Commerce Commission. North Carolina v. United States, 124 F. Supp.
529, 532 (M.D. N.C. 1954). Approval of railroad consolidations creating statutory ex-
emption from the antitrust laws is an administrative issue within the discretion of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S.
173, 187-88 (1959). See generally Conant, Railroad Consolidations and the Antitrust
Laws, 14 STAN. L. REv. 489 (1962).
111. See Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjiatmenwt: A Case Study
i Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273, 322-35 (1962) ; Freund, Power of Zoning Boards of Ap-
peals to Grant Variances, 20 NAT'L MUNic. REv. 537 (1931).
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weight, and (2) a statutory requirement that the administrative agency
make detailed, written findings of fact, so that a reviewing court is able
to pass on an allegation of ultra vires action.
Administrative (executive) orders. The executive order of an
administrative agency informs a citizen of the particular way he must
perform an existing statutory duty. It differs from the judgment of a
court in that it does not determine existing legal rights but deals with
the execution of rights which are not in contest. Executive orders are
issued by agencies in exercising supervisory powers pursuant to enabling
statutes over the activities of business firms, labor unions, and other
groups. The Federal Communications Commission, for example, has
the power to order a daytime broadcasting station to cease predawn
operations when the station's license permitted the FCC to issue such
order upon a finding of undue interference." 2 Other examples are the
notices of acreage allotments and marketing quotas under the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act,"' and the certification by the National Labor
Relations Board, after an employees' election, of the proper bergaining
representative." 4 Where a court leaves enforcement of its decree to the
Federal Trade Commission, an order by the FTC to defendant to file a
report on compliance is also clearly executive." 5
It is notable that the investigative functions of an administrative
agency in preparation of an executive order are different from investi-
gations which precede rule making. Moreover, administrative investi-
gations vary greatly in form even for different types of executive
orders. An investigation of a charge of deceptive television program-
ming, for example, would take a form radically different from the
holding of an employees' election under the National Labor Relations
Act preparatory to certifying the proper bargaining representatives.
The only aspect which these types of investigations seem to have in
common is that both are subject to the constitutional due process pro-
hibition or arbitrary action."6
112. Music Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 217 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1954). For debat-
able power of F.C.C. to issue orders terminating deceptive programming see Note, 108
U. PA. L. REv. 868 (1960); Davis, Administrative Powers of Supervising, Prosecuthng,
Advising, Declaring, and Informally Adiudicating, 63 -ARV. L. REv. 193, 194-206 (1949).
113. 52 Stat. 62 (1938), 7 U.S.C. § 1362 (1958) ; United States v. Lillard, 143
F. Supp. 113, 116-18 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
114. National Labor Relations Act § 9, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159(1958); NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, 339 U.S. 563 (1950). See Switchmen's Union v.
National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943), for a similar order under the Railway
Labor Act.
115. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 641 (1950).
116. See note 124 infra and accompanying text.
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Mediation and arbitration of private disputes. Administrative
mediation and arbitration pursuant to a statute are two means of settling
disputes (1) where there is no judicial remedy or (2) where adminis-
trative findings of fact are clearly more accurate and efficient than
those of a jury. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services in
the field of labor-management disputes over wages and working condi-
tions is an example of the first category." 7 The state and federal work-
men's compensation statutes are examples of the second category" 8
Depending on the state, workmen's compensation statutes either replace
or offer as an alternative to common law tort remedies a system of
compulsory insurance for job injury plus either compulsory or voluntary
arbitration of the amount of the injury. In an action to set aside such
an arbitration award, the compensation commission's expert finding of
fact of the amount of injury will not be set aside unless arbitrary
(without rational basis), but the jurisdictional fact of whether claimant
was an employee is in part a legal issue subject to trial de novo in a
court."'
Prosecuting violations, negotiating settlements and consent decrees.
One of the largest executive functions of administrative agencies is the
investigation of statutory violations, preparing prosecutions, negotiating
settlements or consent decrees, and filing complaints. Examples are
prosecutions of unfair labor practices by the National Labor Relations
Board120 and the prosecutions of unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce by the Federal Trade
Commission.' The special knowledge of its particular subject matter
may enable the administrative agency to detect violations and assemble
evidence thereof more easily than could the Justice Department. Like-
117. 61 Stat. 152-54 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-75 (1958).
118. See, e.g., Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat.
1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1958). See generally DODD, THE ADMrINISTRATION OF
WORlsEN'S COMPENSATION (1936); BROWN, THE ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMREN'S
COMPENSATION (1933) ; CHEIT, INJURY AND RECOVERY IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
(1961).
119. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60-65 (1932). Where petitioner in injunction
action to set aside award concedes that all evidence is in Commission record, trial de novo
may be denied, since the court can determine jurisdictional questions from record on a
motion to dismiss the action. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. O'Leary, 288 F.2d 542 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961). See Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and
Jurisdictional Fact, 70 HARv. L. REV. 953 (1957) ; Manuel, Administrative Law: May
Either a State or Congress Vest in an Administrative Tribunal the Conchsive Deter-
mination of a Question of Law?, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 683 (1938).
120. National Labor Relations Act §§ 10-11, 49 Stat. 453-55 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§
160-61 (1958).
121. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1958). See 4 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS §§ 95.1-.3 (2d ed.
1950).
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wise, a determination of what constitutes an adequate settlement or con-
sent decree in order to prevent similar later violations may require the
expert knowledge of the administrative specialist.
122
B. Constitutional and Statutory Limitations.
The primary constitutional limitations on executive action are those
of due process and equal protection of the laws. 2 ' The essence of execu-
tive due process is that the action of the executive officer not be arbitrary;
i.e., his action must have a rational relation to the execution of a valid
statute within his assigned duties.'24 It is in the context of protecting
those who are regulated from arbitrary action that the importance of clear
and intelligible standards in enabling statutes can be seen. In the usual
appeal of an administrative action to the courts, the courts will have to
search the statutes and rules to determine the validity of the challenged
acts. Absent intelligible standards, the courts may be unable to determine
whether the acts are rationally related to the objectives of the statute
and not ultra vires.
Like legislative due process, and in contrast to judicial process,
executive due process does not require any established formal proced-
ure. 22 As long as the executive officer does not violate specific statu-
tory or constitutional limitations, he may devise what he considers the
most efficacious method of accomplishing his tasks.' Thus hearing
or oral argument is not a required element of constitutional due process
in the issuance of licenses. 2 ' Nor is there a right to an informal con-
ference before a stop order suspends registration of shares under the
Securities Act of 1933.Y
122. See Pittsburgh Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 150 (1941).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co., 340 U.S. 419, 449
(1951) ; Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 710 (1945) ; United States
v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 562-65 (1939); Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301
U.S. 183, 188 (1937); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
124. General Protective Comm. v. SEC, 346 U.S. 521, 536 (1954). See also note
95 supra.
125. Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 710 (1945); Lacomastic
Corp. v. Parker, 54 F. Supp. 139, 141-42 (1944) ; Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 129
F.2d 126, 134 (6th Cir.1942).
126. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 112-13 (1946); Railroad
Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 580-82 (1940); Western Air Lines
v. CAB, 184 F.2d 545, 551 (9th Cir. 1950).
127. FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 281 (1949) ; Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U.S.
183, 189 (1937) ; American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 179 F.2d 437, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ;
Clapp v. Ulbrich, 140 Conn. 637, 103 A.2d 195, 197 (1954) ; Thayer Amusement Corp.
v. Moulton, 63 R.I. 182, 7 A.2d 682, 689 (1939).
128. Columbia Gen. Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 265 F.2d 559, 565-66 (5th Cir. 1959).
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V. THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The judicial power is the authority to hear and make enforceable
decisions of controversies concerning the alleged invasion of existing
legal rights. 2 ' The judicial power thus has two necessary elements:
(1) interpreting what law is applicable to controversies over alleged
existing legal rights, 30 and (2) issuing an enforceable order which
extinguishes the original claim by finally determining what legal rights
and duties exist in the parties (subject to appellate court review).'
The judicial function-the exercise of the judicial power-includes
determination of what common-law courts have traditionally character-
ized as legal issues, as opposed to the finding of facts." 2 It is distin-
guished from the legislative function of creating or extinguishing classes
of legal rights (determining what the law shall be) by its particu-
larity and by its determination of presently existing, but contested, rights
of the parties under laws which existed when the controversy arose. 33
The judicial function is distinguished from the executive function of
enabling or directing action when legal rights are not in contest and the
prosecution of claims when existing legal rights are in contest (admin-
istering the law) by its final and conclusive determination of contested
legal rights, subject to review only by appellate courts.'
129. "A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand
on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist." Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 221 (1908) (Holmes, J.). See Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911) ; Johnson v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, Inc., 357 Mich. 254,
98 N.W.2d 586, 588 (1959) ; State v. Bonner, 123 Mont. 414, 214 P.2d 747, 753 (1950) ;
Laverty v. Cochran, 132 Neb. 118, 271 N.W. 354, 357 (1937) ; In re Klein, 309 N.Y. 474,
131 N.E.2d 888, 891-92 (1956); Stanton v. State Tax Comm'n, 114 Ohio St. 658, 151
N.E. 760, 764 (1926) ; Corwin, The Constitution of the United States of America, S.
Doc. No. 170, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 511 (1953). For a discussion of the definition of legal
right see Rutledge, Legal Personality-Legislative or Judicial Prerogative, 14 ST. Louis
L. REv. 346, 362 (1929). See generally Brown, Administrative Commissions and the
Judicial Power, 19 MINN. L. REv. 261 (1935).
130. Controversy is used here in the broad sense to include the imminent contro-
versy subject to declaratory judgment. See Borchard, The Constitutionality of Declara-
tory Jvdgments, 31 COLUm. L. Rav. 561 (1931).
131. See Green, Separation of Governmental Powers, 29 YALE L.J. 369, 378 (1920)
Warp, Independent Regulatory Commissions and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 16
NOTRE DAmE LAW. 181, 190 (1941).
132. Findings of fact in a controversy, though sometimes made by judges, are not
peculiarly a judicial function. This may be made by a jury, stipulated by the parties,
or found by an expert fact-finding body, such as a workmen's compensation commission.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932). See also Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v.
Bankers Trust Co., 318 U.S. 163, 170 (1943) ; Sullivan v. Union Stockyards Co., 26 F.2d
60, 61 (8th Cir. 1928).
133. Mitchell v. Lowden, 288 Ill. 327, 123 N.E. 566, 572 (1919) ; In re Manufac-
turer's Freight Forwarding Co., 294 Mich. 57, 292 N.W. 678, 680 (1940).
134. Sullivan v. Sao Paulo, 122 F.2d 355, 358 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Devine v. Brunswick-
Balke-Collender Co., 270 Ill. 504, 110 N.E. 780, 782-73 (1915). See Pillsbury, Adminis-
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"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."' 35  Except for the impeachment
power which is vested in Congress, the Constitution vests the entire
federal judicial power in the Courts."' Unlike the English Constitu-
tion, under which the legislature exercises appellate judicial powers, our
written Constitution impliedly prohibits the legislative assumption of
judicial powers." 7 Nor may the executive assume any judicial powers
except those vested in it under the war powers."8
The separation of governmental powers under our Constitution is
thus found in its most strict and complete form in separation of the
judiciary from the legislative and executive."' Under our system of
judicial supremacy, the judiciary is the operative check on possible arbi-
trative Tribunals, 36 HARV. L. REv. 583 (1923); Schwartz, The Administrative Agency
in Historical Perspective, 36 1D. L. J. 263, 264-66 (1961).
135. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
136. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 82 (1907) ; Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United
States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 192 (1880);
Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. (69 U.S.) 561 (1864) ; 1 KENT, COMMAENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAw 291 (14th ed. 1896) ; 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 397 (4th ed. 1873).
The holdings that Congress may create "legislative" courts, which render enforce-
able legal judgments but which are not part of the federal judiciary as defined in article
III of the Constitution, are clearly inconsistent with the mandate for a separate and
independent judiciary. The decisions which upheld the mixing of judicial and executive
functions in such courts and the removal of judges by the President seem to be in error.
Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) ; see Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S.
438 (1929) ; Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARv. L. REV. 894 (1930).
137. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349, 368 (1936) (dictum);
Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893) ; Killbourn v. Thomp-
son, 103 U.S. 168, 189 (1880) ; United States v. O'Grady, 22 Wall. (89 U.S.) 641, 647-
48 (1874) ; United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 128, 147-48 (1871) ; Walker v.
United States, 83 F.2d 103, 106 (8th Cir. 1936) ; Chase v. United States, 222 Fed. 593,
596 (8th Cir. 1915) ; United States v. Bauman, 56 F. Supp. 109, 119 (D. Ore. 1943).
138. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946) ; United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. (80
U.S.) 128, 147-48 (1871); American-Hawaiian S.S. Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp.
378, 382-83 (Ct. Cf. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 863 (1955). See also Chicago & So.
Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1948).
139. At the formation of our constitution, whatever might have been the
prior connexion between the legislative and judicial departments, a great solici-
tude existed to keep them, thence forward, on the subject of private controversies,
separate and independent. [1 BI.C. Apx. A: Letter of judges sup. court of
United States, April, 1792.]
It was well known and considered, that "in the distinct and separate ex-
istence of the judicial power consists one main preservative of the publick
liberty' [BI. Com. 269] ; that indeed 'there is no liberty if the power of judging
be not separated from the legislative and executive powers" [Montesquieu, B.I.
Ch. 6]. In other words that "Union of these two powers is tyranny" [7 Johnson
508]; or as Mr. Madison observes, may justly be 'pronounced the very defini-
tion of tyranny' [Fed. No. 47], or in the language of Mr. Jefferson, 'is precisely
the definition of despotick government' [Notes on Vir. 195].
Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 208-09 (1818). See Fairlie, The Separation of Powers,
21 MICH. L. Rxv. 393, 404 (1923).
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trary action by legislatures or executive officers. The effectiveness of
the judicial bar to arbitrary and oppressive government is dependent
above all on the independence of the judiciary.' In the classic state-
ment of Lord Coke: "No man may be a judge in his own cause."''
Neither the legislature which has exercised the sovereign law-making
power in enacting a statute nor the executive officers charged with en-
forcing a statute may sit in judgment of a defendant charged with
violating the statute. For both the legislature and executive, in their
efforts to govern, have a vested and therefore biased interest in un-
limited statutory enforcement.'42 They cannot be impartial judges of
the constitutional limitations on their own acts;143 only an independent
judiciary can perform this function. Blackstone held an independent
judiciary essential to the preservation of liberty. 44 His views coupled
with the unhappy colonial experience with the exercise of judicial powers
by legislatures must have impressed many of the founding fathers with
the importance of establishing an independent judiciary, with its own
inviolable province."'
140. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 531-34 (1933) ; Evans v. Gore,
253 U.S. 245, 248-53 (1920). "The complete independence of the courts of justice is
peculiarly essential in a limited constitution." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 100 (Bourne
ed. 1947) (Hamilton).
141. For citations and discussion see Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of
American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REv. 365, 370 (1929); MASON, LANGUAGE OF
DISSENT 303 (1959) ; Berger, Removal of Judicial Functions from Federal Trade Com-
mission to a Trade Court: A Reply to Mr. Kintner, 59 MICH. L. REv. 199, 204-06 (1960).
142. "[B]ias from strong and sincere conviction as to public policy may operate as
a more serious disqualification than pecuniary interest." Committee on Ministers'
Powers, Report, Cai1. No. 4060, at 78 (1932). "Unlike a judge, who is theoretically
neutral about governmental programs, an administrator often has an affirmative pro-
gram to carry out; he often has a mission, a purpose, a policy." Statement by Profes-
sor Davis in report of the Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Independent Regulatory Commissions, H.R.
Doc. No. 2711, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1959). See Cooper, The Executive Department
of Government and the Rule of Law, 59 MIcH. L. R.v. 515, 517-18 (1961).
143. "From a body which had even a partial agency in passing bad laws, we could
rarely expect a disposition to temper and moderate them in the application. The same
spirit which had operated in making them would be too apt to influence their construc-
tion; still less could it be expected that men who had infringed the Constitution in the
character of legislators would be disposed to repair the breach in that of judges." THE
FEDERALIST No. 81, at 121 (Bourne ed. 1947) (Hamilton).
144. "In this distinct and separate existence of the judicial power in a peculiar
body of men, nominated indeed, but not removable at pleasure, by the crown, consists
one main preservation of the public liberty; which cannot subsist long in any state, un-
less the administration of common justice be in some degree separated from the legisla-
tive." BLACKSTONE, COMMENT IES ON THE LAWs OF ENGLAND 269, in Sharp, The
Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers" 2 U. CHn. L. REv. 385, 392
(1935).
145. Id. at 393. See also Vright, The Origins of the Separation of Powers in
America, 13 EcoNouXicA 139, 169 (1933). Chancellor Kent is an authority for the view
that an independent judiciary is a keystone of the federal Constitution: "The constitu-
tions of several of the United States .. .have an express provision that the legislative
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Consonant with the constitutional mandate for an independent
judiciary as a separate department of government is the rule that the
judicial power is non-delegable. 4" Unlike the legislature, the judiciary
is not a duty-assigning branch of government."' Judges are appointed
or elected for their personal qualifications to perform the judicial func-
tion, and unlike legislators, judges are not laymen chosen from the
population as a whole. Because the judiciary is a true example of a
body of men with specialized skills and technical knowledge, the act of
judging is unquestionably a personal duty.'48 Hence, any attempt by a
judge to delegate his clearly judicial functions to a legislative or admin,-
istrative agency would seem to violate both his oath of office and the
constitutional separation of powers.
The legislative and executive departments are subject to an addi-
tional constitutional constraint: under the Constitution they have not been
vested with any general judicial power. 4 Ipso facto, they also are
constitutionally unable to delegate clearly judicial functions to adminis-
trative agencies.' From these constitutional premises, it necessarily
and judicial powers shall be preserved separate and distinct, so that one department shall
not exercise the functions belonging to the other. . . . [W]e have a most commanding
authority, in the sense of the American people, that the right to interpret laws does, and
ought to belong exclusively to the courts of justice." Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. R.
477, 508-09 (N.Y. 1811) (Kent, C. J.). See also note 4 supra. Also echoing this view
was Chief Justice Marshall: "The Judicial Department comes home in its effects to
every man's fireside; it passes on his property, his reputation, his life, his all. Is it
not, to the last degree important that he [the judge] should be rendered perfectly and
completely independent, with nothing to influence or control him but God and his con-
science? . . . I have always thought, from my earliest youth till now, that the greatest
scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted on an ungrateful and a sinning people, was an
ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent judiciary." MARSHALL, DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA
STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, 616, 619, in O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516
532 (1933). And Justice Story's quotation of the Federalist Papers affirms this posi-
tion as his also. 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
391-93 (4th ed. 1873).
146. Whitehead v. United States, 155 F.2d 460, 462 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 747 (1946); NLRB v. New York Merchandise Co., 134 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir.
1943). For similar decisions under state constitutions see 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §
166 (1956).
147. Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions, 27 YALE L. J. 892, 897
(1918).
148. "One of the conditions which attaches to formal judicial proceedings is the
rule that the judges shall personally hear and determine the matters to be decided. A
judge who absented himself habitually from court and installed a friend as permanent
locum tenans, or who handed over part of a trial to a subordinate, would not be per-
mitted to remain on the bench." RoBsoN, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 68 (3d ed.
1951).
149. The judicial power is vested entirely in the courts. See note 136 supra. The
legislature and executive are prohibited from assuming or usurping judicial power. See
notes 137-38 supra.
150. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56-57 (1932) ; South Chicago Coal & Dock
Co. v. Bassett, 104 F.2d 522, 525 (7th Cir. 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 251 (1940) ; United
States v. Sugar, 243 Fed. 423, 431 (E.D. Mich. 1917), aff'd, 252 Fed. 79 (6th Cir.),
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
follows that the courts may not acquiesce in legislative attempts to dele-
gate to administrative agencies clearly judicial functions. Since the
legislature has no judicial power to delegate, it would merely be direct-
ing the administrative officers to usurp judicial power. And the Su-
preme Court has held without exception that the constitutional separa-
tion of powers doctrine prevents the judiciary from approving any
usurpation of judicial power by legislative or executive officers. 5 ' This
elementary logic prevails in all jurisdictions where the constitutions vest
the entire judicial power in the courts." 2
It would be an inadequate counter argument to maintain that pol-
iticians in administrative agencies, dependent on the chief executive and
his party machine for renewed or higher political appointments, may per-
form trial court functions so long as their decisions are subject to judi-
cial review. The procedural due process which the Constitution requires
in judicial proceedings (full, fair and unbiased hearing) does not com-
mence at the appellate level; rather it is of utmost importance at the
trial level. A trial before an executive officer, who is untrained in law
and whose superiors are the prosecutors, cannot be made the equivalent
of a fair trial on the basis of a finding in a reviewing court that there
is support for the trial decision within the conflicting evidence in the
record.' If the American people had wished to trust politicians sub-
servient to the executive with the power to judge controversies by mak-
ing enforceable initial determinations of legal issues (or mixed ques-
tions of law and fact), their representatives would have written this
exceptional allocation of judicial power into the Constitution. Since the
power to amend the Constitution is reserved to the people (states),
appellate courts are constitutionally unable to sanction any legislative
attempts to transfer trial court functions to administrative agencies.
Judicial due process can be obtained only in a court.
Some commentators have suggested that in a few classic cases the
cert. denied, 248 U.S. 578 (1918). A statute may not delegate to an executive officer
the power to make a final determination whether a person seeking entry to the United
States is a native-born citizen, if that person's petition for judicial review and for trial
of issue of citizenship is accompanied by at least sufficient evidence to make out a prima
facie case. Sing Tuck v. United States, 128 Fed. 592, 593 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 194 U.S. 161, 170 (1904). This right to judicial determination of alleged citi-
zenship is now codified and supercedes the former constitutional procedure in these cases
of habeas corpus. Samaniego v. Brownell, 212 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1954).
151. See notes 139-40 supra.
152. See, e.g., Jersey Maid Milk Prods. Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577,
594 (1939) ; State v. Finch, 79 Idaho 275, 315 P.2d 529, 531-32 (1957). For cases in
other states see 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 173 nn. 76 & 77 (1956).
153. See Berger, supra note 141, at 218, on the inadequacy of judicial review as a
substitute for a fair trial.
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Supreme Court has approved the summary but final determination of
legal rights by executive officers. This is not so. In Murray's Lessee
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 54 a case often cited in support
of this proposition, it was held that the Treasury Department could
determine the amount due from a delinquent revenue agent and issue
an enforceable distress warrant against him. Yet this was merely an
executive action similar to attachment, because the statute gave the tax
agent the privilege of filing an action before the levy was completed so
that he received a court determination if he chose to contest the alleged
delinquency. 5 In Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett,"56 Mr. Justice Holmes
held that a Georgia statute did not violate due process because it pro-
vided that the state superintendent of banks might issue summary ex-
ecutions against bank stockholders to enforce statutory double liability
to depositors. By the statute, stockholders were permitted to file an
affidavit of illegality, which entitled them to raise and try every pos-
sible defense in a court. Here again the execution was in effect an
attachment-a lien dependent for its effect upon the result of the suit." 7
In Lawton v. Steele,' the Court held that a statute allowing an execu-
tive officer to destroy summarily as a public nuisance fish nets used in
violation of statute was not a denial of due process. In summarily
abating the alleged nuisance, the executive officer made no conclusive
determination of legal rights. The claim of the property owner was
subject to trial in an action for replevin of the nets or in damages
against the officer.'
There are, however, a number of federal and state administrative
agencies which determine legal issues and mixed questions of law and
fact in controversies, whose decisions are enforceable and not subject
to trial de novo in a court.' Under the analysis above, these exercises
of clearly judicial functions by administrative agencies are unconstitu-
tional usurpations of judicial power by them.' The courts which have
154. 18 How. (59 U.S.) 272 (1855).
155. Id. at 285. See Schwartz, Procedural Due Process in Federal Administrative
Law, 25 N.Y.U.L. REV. 552, 572-73 (1950).
156. 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
157. Id. at 31.
158. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
159. Id. at 142. See Samuels v. McCundy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925) ; North Am. Cold
Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
160. "Without doubt the most acute problem of our administrative system is cre-
ated by the so-called combination of prosecuting and adjudicating functions within one
agency." Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1273, 1278 (1955) ; AD-
MINISTRATIVE PRoc. REP. 206.
161. See Katcher, Are Admhistrative Agencies Usurping Judicial Powerst, 30
N.Y.S.B.A. BULL. 442, 444 (1958).
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sanctioned such action seem to have overlooked the strict application of
the separation of powers as applied to the guarantee of an independent
judiciary. In such cases, the courts have sanctioned abolition of the
right to due process in a trial court for the initial determination of legal
issues. A discussion of four types of such judicial orders follows.
Cease and desist orders. The cease and desist order, directing a
person not to engage in specific acts in the future, is equivalent to the
civil remedy of injunction. "' Seven federal agencies are empowered to
enforce statutory prohibitions of unfair methods of competition, unfair
practices, or violation of licenses and rules in commerce through issu-
ance of cease and desist or similar orders.' Cease and desist orders of
the Federal Trade Commission-the largest group of such orders-are
enforced in the appropriate United States Court of Appeals. In such
proceeding the statute provides that the FTC's findings of fact are con-
clusive if supported by substantial evidence;.. and this rule is also
applied to mixed questions of law and fact. In a false advertising case,
for example, the finding that the advertisements deceive the public is
also a legal holding that an unfair or deceptive act or practice has oc-
curred. Thus, the decisions of an administrative commission, charged
with the executive duty of enforcing a statute, determine legal issues
and are given the weight of those of a trial court. Such a case may be
heard before as many as five different hearing examiners,'65 who are
162. NLRB v. Tehel Bottling Co., 129 F.2d 250, 255 (8th Cir. 1942); NLRB v.
Colten, 105 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir. 1939). See U.S. COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF EX-
ECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOV'T, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 245
(1955) (hereinafter referred to as TASK FORCE REP.) ; A.B.A., Report of the Special
Committee on Administrative Law, 61 A.B.A. REP. 749 (1936) ; CHANTBERLIN, DOWLING
& HAYS, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDFRAL ADMINISTRATIVE AENCIES 134 (1942);
Berger, supra note 141, at 220.
163. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C.§ 45(f) (Supp. IV, 1963) (Federal Trade Commission); 61 Stat. 146 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1)-(m) (Supp. IV,
1963) (National Labor Relations Board) ; 72 Stat. 769 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1958)
(Civil Aeronautics Board) ; 74 Stat. 893 (1960), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (Supp.
IV, 1963) (Federal Communication Commission) ; 42 Stat. 161 (1921), as amended, 7
U.S.C. § 193 (1958), and 42 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1958) (Secretary of
Agriculture) ; 48 Stat. 1214 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 522 (1958) (Secretary of
Interior) ; 46 Stat. 703 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958) (Tariff Commis-
sion).
164. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1958). Similar pre-
sumptions hold on appeals from unfair labor practice hearings under the National Labor
Relations Act, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958) ; and from
orders of the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat.
162 (1921), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 194 (1958). The same presumptions also hold on
appeals from the Tariff Commission to the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals. 46 Stat. 703 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1958).
165. Vacu-Matic Carburetor Co. v. FTC, 157 F.2d 711, 713-14 (7th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947).
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not bound to follow legal rules of evidence.' While the Commission
is not required to accept the findings of hearing examiners, 167 it must
nevertheless appraise the credibility of witnesses which it has not seen."',
And the Commission's rulings of violation of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, though the evidence is so conflicting that it might have
supported the contrary, are upheld unless they are arbitrary or clearly
wrong.1
69
In reviewing the constitutionality of cease and desist orders, the
courts have sidestepped the issue of separation of powers. Even though
such orders of administrative agencies determine mixed questions of law
and fact and very limited review is available upon application for en-
forcement, the courts have uniformly refused to recognize that they are
a clear exercise of judicial power. In early cases, such orders were
labeled quasi-judicial. Though they determined legal issues, they were
held not to be judicial because they were not issued by courts and the
Commission had no power itself to issue execution."' In these cases,
the authorities cited uphold congressional delegations of secondary legis-
lative functions, not judicial functions. None of the reviewing courts
recognized that the legislature has no judicial power to delegate, nor do
any of them offer a rigorous definition of the judicial power.
The courts have also sidestepped the issue of the constitutional
right to due process in trial proceedings. They have uniformly held
that the provisions for judicial review satisfy due process requirements
and make the Federal Trade Commission proceedings constitutional.17
166. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 704-05 (1948) ; Concrete Materials
Corp. v. FTC, 189 F.2d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 1951) ; Stanley Laboratories v. FTC, 138 F.2d
388, 392 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n v. FTC, 18 F.2d 866, 871-
72 (Sth Cir. 1927). Similar holdings can be found in unfair labor practice hearings:
NLRB v. Hearst, 102 F.2d 658, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1939); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 95 F.2d 390, 395 (2d Cir.), modified on other grounds, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
167. Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 601 (9th Cir. 1957).
168. Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 739 (1945); Erickson v.
FTC, 272 F.2d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Tractor Training Serv. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 420,
424 (9th Cir. 1955).
169. Carter Prods. Co. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461, 496 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
884 (1959) ; Standard Distribs. v. FTC, 211 F.2d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Excelsior Lab. v.
FTC, 171 F.2d 484, 486 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106, 108 (5th
Cir. 1945); Phelps Dodge Refining Corp. v. FTC, 139 F.2d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 1943).
170. FTC v. F. A. Martoccio Co., 87 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1937) ; FTC v. A. McLean
& Sons, 84 F.2d 910, 912 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 590 (1936) ; National Har-
ness Mfrs.' Ass'n v. FTC, 268 Fed. 705, 707-08 (6th Cir. 1920) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. FTC, 258 Fed. 307, 312 (7th Cir. 1919).
171. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 147 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Ostler
Candy Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 675 (1940) ;
National Candy Co. v. FTC, 104 F.2d 999, 1004 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 610
(1939). Similar holdings can be found for National Labor Relation Board orders to
cease and desist from unfair labor practices: Precision Castings Co. v. Boland, 13 F.
Supp. 877, 883-84 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 85 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1936).
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This is a non sequitur.' 2 Just because limited judicial review is per-
mitted does not mean that executive usurpation of trial court functions
fulfills judicial due process. A member of the Federal Reserve Board,
without legal training, responsible only to the prosecuting executive
agency, is surely unqualified to preside at an antitrust trial, make find-
ings of fact and the initial determination of legality. Yet this clear
violation of the traditional due process concept of unbiased trial hearing
before independent judiciary took place in Transamerica Corp. v. Board
of Governors.' Surely, remand for retrial of an erroneous, biased
decision to the same or another unqualified and politically dependent
administrative "judge" would not accomplish procedural due process.
Nor is denial of cross-examination or bias of the trier of fact ever
approved as judicial due process in trial courts. Yet denials by the
Federal Trade Commission of cross examination in a false advertising
prosecution74 and denials of affidavits of Commission bias in two anti,-
trust prosecutions"7 were upheld on review. In these administrative
injunction cases, appellate courts seemed to have unwittingly and erron-
eously accepted the idea that constitutional due process in judicial pro-
ceedings begins at the appellate level. As was noted above, this is error.
Orders for deportation of resident aliens. "[O]nce an alien law-
fully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the
rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our bor-
ders."17  In other words, any alien who claims to have entered the
United States lawfully on an immigration visa can be said to have ac-
quired a "right" to remain here, of which he cannot be deprived without
the full and unbiased hearing that constitutes compliance with the dictates
of due process of law.' A determination of whether an alien entered
172. "The view sometimes adopted that the right of appeal to the courts, either in
wide or limited measure, saves action of an executive board from a valid charge of
judicial invasion is not considered to be sound in principle. Authority to correct its
errors does not alter the character of its undertaking." In re Opinion of the Justices,
87 N.H. 492, 179 At. 344, 346 (1935).
173. The erroneous findings and decision of the Federal Reserve Board were re-
versed in Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 168 (3d Cir. 1953).
See TASK FORCE REP. 252-53.
174. Concrete Materials Corp. v. FTC, 189 F.2d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 1951).
175. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 700-03 (1948); Marquette Cement
Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 147 F.2d 589, 592-93 (7th Cir. 1954).
176. Bridges v. WLxon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring);
Schwartz, Procedural Due Process in Federal Administrative Law, 25 N.Y.U.L. REy.
552, 559 (1950).
177. "Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great
hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in
this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty-at times a most serious one-can-
not be doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by which he .is
deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness." Bridges v. Wixon,
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lawfully or of whether he committed an act that is a statutory ground for
deportation becomes a determination of his legal right to remain in the
United States. This determination of legal rights in a controversy, not
subject to trial do novo in a court,' is clearly the exercise of a judicial
function. Even though the Supreme Court has held banishment not to be
penal,'79 one would expect at least the full due process of a civil case in
a trial court. Yet our deportation proceedings are administrative.'
Although the courts say that due process requires a hearing before de-
portation,' 8 ' the present statute provides for hearing only before an
untrained executive officer."2  Rules of evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings do not obtain, 8 ' and a decision for the defendant by the
inquiry officer who heard the case can be reviewed and reversed by an
executive review board. 4 The administrative arrest pending deporta-
tion provides for hearing only before enforcing officers and the con-
stitutional protections for criminal defendants do not apply.
185
No matter how strictly the appellate courts should try to enforce
judicial due process before executive officers, 8 ' the likelihood of success
is small. Mvoreover there remains the grossest constitutional denial in
326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598 (1953):
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950) ; see also The Japanese Immi-
grant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903).
178. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding following an executive deportation order,
the court will not review the evidence beyond ascertaining that there is some evidence to
support the order. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 149 (1945) ; Kessler v. Strecker, 307
U.S. 22, 34 (1939); Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1907). See also
United States ex rel. Brzovich v. Holton, 222 F.2d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 1955) ; Prassinos
v. District Director, Immigration & Nationalization Serv., 193 F. Supp. 416, 419 (N.D.
Ohio 1960) ; Note, 62 YALE L.J. 1000 (1953).
179. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
180. Only where the alleged alien makes a claim of citizenship is he entitled to a
judicial proceeding. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1922).
181. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903). See generally 1
DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.15 (1958), on aliens' rights to hearings in
exclusion and deportation cases.
182. 66 Stat. 208 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1958); see United
States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103 (1907).
183. Bhagat Singh v. McGrath, 104 F.2d 122, 123 (9th Cir. 1939), cert. dismissed,
308 U.S. 629 (1940) ; Sercerchi v. Ward, 27 F. Supp. 437, 439-40 (D. Mass. 1939) ; In re
Giacobbi, 32 F. Supp. 508, 517 (N.D. N.Y. 1939), aff'd, 111 F.2d 297 (1940). See also
Comment, 23 TEXAS L. REv. 386 (1945); Comment, 3 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 104 (1934).
184. Brunner v. Del Guercio, 259 F.2d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1958).
185. Horowitz, Administrative Arrest Pending Deportation Proceedings, 12 SYRA-
cusE L. REV. 184, 196-99 (1960) ; H.R. Doc. No. 392, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1936).
See also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) ; Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 158
(1923).
186. Maslow, Recasting Oir Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM.
L. REv. 307, 320-21 (1956) ; GORDON & ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 4.3b (1959).
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the violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.'87 The hearing
officer who will judge the case instigated and prosecuted by his super-
iors for the purpose of deporting the alien is asked to weigh fairly both
sides of the evidence and give his impartial judgment on the merits. 8
"It is hard to defend the fairness of a practice that subjects judges to
the power and control of prosecutors. Human nature has not put an
impassable barrier between subjection and subserviency, particularly
when job security is at stake."' 89 In addition to this political dependence
of hearing officers, few of them could qualify even to be recommended
for federal judicial appointment. One post World War II study showed
that only 26.8 percent of full-time hearing officers even possessed a
bachelor's degree.' It is hard to believe that such personnel have the
qualifications to afford judicial due process to an arrested alien, even
if the attempt was made.
The early decisions upholding the executive trial of legal issues in
deportation of aliens confuse the power to exclude non-resident aliens
with the power to deport resident aliens.' The constitutional rights of
resident aliens as persons under the due process clause' 9' which were
recognized in the cases requiring hearings were overlooked in the cases
approving executive deportation. Hence, the courts failed to realize
187. The record discloses a very lax regard for the fundamentals of a fair
hearing. Much is tolerated in such proceedings, and that toleration has appar-
ently borne its fruits. We will not say that we can put our finger on this or
that to reverse, but the attitude of the examiner, the introduction of confused
and voluminous evidence taken elsewhere, the strong indications that the ap-
pellant was vaguely regarded as undesirable, and that deportation was thought
the easiest way to get rid of him and to avoid the normal process of law-all
these warn us of the dangers inherent in a system, where prosecutor and judge
are one and the ordinary rules which protect the accused are in abeyance. It
is apparent how easy is the descent by short cuts to the disposition of cases
without clear legal grounds or evidence which rationally proves them. These
are the essence of any hearing in which personal feelings of the tribunal are
not to be substituted for prescribed standards.
United States ex rel. Iorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920, 922 (2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand, J.).
188. 66 Stat. 208 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1958) ; Note, 31 I-41.
L.J. 218, 220 (1956) ; Note, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 547, 555-56 (1953).
189. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 319 (1955) (Black, J., dissenting).
190. Hearings Before President's Commission on Immigration and Nathraligation
for Use of the House Committee on the Jidiciary, 82 Cong., 2d Sess. 1947 (1952). See
Note, 5 STAN. L. REV. 722, 731 (1953).
191. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893). Although the
deportation order in this case was issued by a judge pursuant to statute, it was without
hearing and was based on the legal determinations of executive officers. Id. at 702-03.
Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 234 (1953) ; Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275
(1912) ; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 468 (1912), citing procedure in three
non-resident exclusion cases; see also United States ex reL Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S.
279, 291-92 (1904).
192. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903). See also Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
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that the deportation hearing determined legal rights of a resident under
law. Since the issue was not raised that the separation of powers doc-
trine which vests the entire judicial power in the judiciary would prohibit
the executive from conclusive determination of legal rights, there is as
yet no clear Supreme Court determination on this executive usurpation
of judicial power.
Revocations of licenses for cause. A governmental license to enter
a business or profession, once issued, creates in the licensee the right to
engage in the activity for the period of the license.'93 Unless the regu-
latory statute or the license itself expressly states that the license creates
no rights and is revocable at will, 9 ' the license can be revoked before
expiration only for cause. In other words, "once a going business has
been established on the basis of a license or certificate of authority,
property rights attach. This means that such license or certificate may
not be revoked, nor may renewal be denied, without procedural and
substantive due process of law."' 95  The revocation of a license for
cause under such circumstances concludes a particular controversy which
resulted from charges of violation of a regulatory statute. It thus makes
an application of law to the alleged facts and determines the existing
legal rights of the defendant. By definition, this is clearly a judicial
function, which, under the separation of governmental powers, is vested
193. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat (22 U.S.) 1, 213-14 (1824); Jordan v. United
Ins. Co. of America, 289 F.2d 778, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Columbia Auto Loan v.
Jordan, 196 F.2d 568, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; It re Carter, 177 F.2d 75, 78 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 900 (1949) ; Arlington Cemetery Corp. v. Bindig, 212 Ga. 698, 94
S.E.2d 378, 382 (1956) ; Burden v. Hoover, 9 Ill. 2d 114, 137 N.E.2d 59, 61-62 (1956) ;
Davis v. Beeler, 185 Tenn. 638, 207 S.W.2d 343, 348 (1948), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S.
859 (1948). See note 97 supra; FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND
PROPERTY 117-28 (1928).
194. Where the licensing statute is for the purpose of restricting entry, such as
regards liquor dealers' permits, the statute may expressly provide that no rights vest
in the licensee. The uncertain term of such license should discourage investment in that
line of activity. Beckanstin v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 140 Conn. 185, 90 A.2d 119, 123
(1953) ; State v. Superior Court, 233 Ind. 563, 122 N.E.2d 9, 10 (1954) ; Gamble v.
Liquor Control Comn'n, 323 Mich. 576, 36 N.W.2d 297, 298 (1949) ; State c.v rel.
Zugravu v. O'Brien, 130 Ohio St. 23, 196 N.E. 664, 666 (1935) ; Olds v. Kirkpatrick,
183 Ore. 105, 191 P.2d 641 (1948) ; Pinzino v. Supervisor of Liquor Control, 334 S.W.2d
20, 27 (Mo. App. 1960) ; Green Mountain Post v. Liquor Control Bd., 117 Vt. 405, 94
A.2d 230, 233 (1953). For an earlier statement of the rule see Siggins v. Chicago, 68
Il1. 372, 378 (1873) (auctioneer's license) ; Mortimer & Dunne, Grant and Revocation of
Licenses, 1957 U. ILL. L. F. 28, 45-49.
195. Jordan v. United Ins. Co. of America, 289 F.2d 778, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
See also Standard Airlines v. CAB, 177 F.2d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Reardon v. Dental
Comm'n, 128 Conn. 116, 20 A.2d 622, 624 (1941) ; Riley v. Wright, 151 Ga. 609, 107 S.E.
857, 859 (1921), noting that for businesses which are per se useful and lawful, summary
revocation of licenses violates due process; Smith v. Department of Registration, 412
Ill. 332, 106 N.E.2d 722, 726 (1952) ; Rossetti v. O'Connel, 172 N.Y.S.2d 716, 718 (Sup.
Ct. 1958) ; It re Kindschi, 52 Wash. 2d 8, 319 P.2d 824, 826 (1958) ; State v. Kelly, 112
S.E.2d 641, 643-44 (W. Va. 1960).
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in the courts.' Even though the original revocation hearing is held
before an administrative board, the defendant is still entitled to trial
de novo in a court.'
In spite of the clearly judicial nature of revocations of licenses for
cause, many courts have upheld revocations by administrative agencies
after only limited appellate review."' The revocation of a license to
practice medicine or dentistry, for example, is surely penal, requiring
strict construction, since it deprives one of earning a livelihood in the
field of his training ... Yet, trials of revocations of such licenses are
given limited appellate review even though held before a board of non;-
lawyers, who are not and cannot be expected to understand rules of
evidence or the meaning of judicial due process."' In many license
revocations, the courts have failed to recognize that revocation of a
license for cause is an enforceable determination of legal rights-a
judicial act.2 ' In others, while recognizing the function to be judicial,
196. "It may be true that the grant of authority to engage in the bonding business
is an administrative act. But the deprivation of that right, once granted, is a judicial
act, requiring due process of law." In re Carter, 177 F.2d 75, 78 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 338 U.S. 900 (1949). See State v. Parrish, 254 N.C. 301, 118 S.E.2d 786, 788
(1961) ; People v. Nothaus, 147 Col. 210, 363 P.2d 180, 182 (1961) ; A.B.A., Report of
the Special Committee on Adninistratve Law, 61 A.B.A. REP. 750-01 (1936).
197. Jordan v. United Ins. Co. of America, 289 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
198. Gibson v. Connecticut Medical Examining Bd., 141 Conn. 218, 104 A.2d 890,
892 (1954) ; Parker v. Department of Registration & Educ., 5 Ill. 2d 288, 125 N.E.2d
494, 496-97 (1955); Board of Medical Registration & Examination v. Moore, 224 Ind.
621, 70 N.E.2d 354, 355 (1947) ; Bandeen v. Howard, 299 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Ky. 1956) ;
Applegate v. Michigan State Bd. of Dentistry, 336 Mich. 42, 57 N.W.2d 438, 440 (1953) ;
State v. Jensen, 205 Minn. 410, 286 N.W. 305, 306 (1939) ; Tompkins v. Board of Re-
gents, 299 N.Y. 469, 87 N.E.2d 517, 520 (1949) ; Farrand v. State Medical Bd., 151 Ohio
St. 222, 85 N.E.2d 113, 115 (1949) ; In re Harmon, 52 Wash. 2d 118, 323 P.2d 653, 655
(1958). See also Barry v. Little, 74 N.H. 319, 68 Adt. 40, 41 (1907); Hecht v.
Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421, 425 (1954).
199. Fuller v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 14 Cal. App. 2d 734, 59 P.2d 171,
175 (1936); State ex rel. Jordan v. Pattishall, 99 Fla. 296, 126 So. 147, 148 (1930);
Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 Pac. 724, 726 (1922) ; Mississippi State Bd. of Den-
tal Examiners v. Mandall, 198 Miss. 49, 21 So. 2d 405, 409 (1945) ; State v. Clark, 288
Mo. 659, 232 S.W. 1031, 1034 (1921) ; New Jersey State Bd. of Optometrists v. Numitz,
21 N.J. Super. 18, 90 A.2d 740, 747 (1952) ; Schireson v. Shafer, 354 Pa. 458, 47 A.2d
665, 667 (1946) ; Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. McClellan, 307 S.W.2d 317,
320 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
200. One chiropractic board without jurisdiction arrogated to itself the power to
find a licensee guilty of crime. Leland v. Kansas State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners,
176 Kan. 334, 270 P.2d 255 (1954). For examples of cases where administrative boards
failed to understand rules of evidence or burdens of proof see Menning v. Department
of Registration & Educ., 14 Ill. 2d 553, 153 N.E.2d 52 (1958) ; Goldsmith v. Kingsford,
92 N.H. 442, 32 A.2d 810 (1943); Stammer v. Board of Regents, 287 N.Y. 359, 39
N.E.2d 913 (1942); Wilson v. State, 337 P.2d 727 (Okla. 1959). Hearsay evidence is
admissible in revocation of a medical license. Bandeen v. Howard, 299 S.W.2d 249, 254
(Ky. 1957).
201, Kram v. Public Util. Comm'n, 126 Conn. 543, 12 A.2d 775, 778 (1940);
Pierstroff v. Board of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 68 Ohio App. 453, 41 N.E.2d
889, 890 (1941) ; It re Harmon, 52 Wash. 2d 118, 323 P.2d 653, 655 (1958).
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the courts rationalize its exercise by an administrative body by relabeling
it quasi-judicial."' In none of these cases has the issue of the separa-
tion of powers been met. Combination of prosecutor and judge in one
body is overlooked or sidestepped," 3 and alleged bias of commissioners
is held unremediable because the statute purporting to delegate judicial
power to administrative agencies to revoke licenses creates no remedy
for agency bias.204
An outstanding present example of the federal agency power of
administrative revocation of licenses for cause is that of the SEC to
revoke registration of over-the-counter brokers and dealers under the
Securities Exchange Act.00 The power of the Commission to expel
members of national securities exchanges also has the same effect as
license revocation.00 In both types of cases, the Commission must try
the contested issues and find that the parties have violated one of the
securities acts before it may revoke their right to continue in busi-
ness.207  In spite of the judicial nature of this determination and the
limited review available, 08 there has been no court decision on the con-
stitutionality of this administrative exercise of clearly judicial power.
In many such cases the Commission charges the defendant with fraud
in the sale of securities and upon hearing makes a finding that the de-
202. Davis v. Arizona State Dental Bd., 56 Ariz. 255, 112 P.2d 877, 879 (1941);
Rudolph v. Athletic Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 898, 902, (Dist. Ct. App.
1960) ; Suckow v. Board of Medical Examiners, 182 Cal. 247, 187 Pac. 965, 966 (1920);
Gibson v. Connecticut Medical Examining Bd., 141 Conn. 218, 104 A.2d 890, 892 (1954);
Reardon v. Dental Comm'n, 128 Conn. 116, 20 A.2d 622, 623 (1941); Applegate v.
Michigan State Bd. of Dentistry, 336 Mich. 42, 57 N.W.2d 438, 440 (1953); Hecht v.
Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421, 424-25 (1954).
203. Jacobs v. Board of Dental Examiners, 189 Cal. 709, 209 Pac. 1006, 1007 (1922);
Tarr v. Hallihan, 375 Ill. 38, 30 N.E.2d 421, 422 (1940).
204. Winning v. Board of Dental Examiners, 114 Cal. App. 658, 300 Pac. 867, 868
(1931) ; Ohio Transport v. Public Util. Comm'n, 164 Ohio St. 98, 128 N.E.2d 22, 28-29
(1955). But see dictum in Andrew Iannetta Funeral Home v. State Bd. of Undertakers,
27 F. Supp. 518, 519 (E.D. Pa. 1939).
205. 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1958). See also 2 Loss,
SEcuRiTiEs REGULATION 1301-37 (2d ed. 1961). For similar power of Secretary of Ag-
riculture to revoke trading privileges of commission merchants and floor brokers on com-
modity exchanges see Commodity Exchange Act, 42 Stat. 1001 (1922), as amended,
7 U.S.C. § 9 (1958).
206. 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 785(a) (3) (1958). See Wright v. SEC,
134 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1943).
207. One decision presents as legal doctrine the non sequitur, that because revoca-
tion of registration is only a means to protect the public interest, it is not punitive, not
a penalty imposed on the broker. Blaise D'Antonio & Associates v. SEC, 289 F.2d 276,
277 (5th Cir. 1961).
208. Upon review in the United States Court of Appeals, "the finding of the Com-
mission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 48
Stat. 901 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1958). See Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 799 (8th
Cir. 1943) ; Norris & Hirshberg v. SEC, 163 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
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fendant committed fraud. " Requiring strict adherence to the notice
and hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act21" may
insure partial compliance with due process, but such requirements leave
unanswered the charge of usurpation of judicial power by the combina-
tion of prosecutor and judge in the Commission.
Imposition of mony penalties; awards of reparations. Money
penalties are presently imposed by a number of federal agencies. 11 In
some cases, executive officers have power to force payment of penalties
by withholding permits to continue the particular business operation. 12
The Hoover Commission Task Force recommended that all such impos-
ition of money penalties and the authority to remit money penalties be
transferred to the courts." 3 In the examples cited by the Task Force,
however, executive officers merely assessed penalties and tried to force
collection." 4 In such instances, there has been no directly enforceable
determination whether the executive officers have acted legally. Rather
the parties affected may refuse to pay and let the regulatory agencies sue
for the penalty, or they may pay the penalty and then sue for its re-
covery on the ground that its assessment was illegal. In either event, the
party against whom the penalty was assessed received a trial in court to
determine the legality of the assessment. Hence an argument that the
mere assessment of penalties by an administrative officer is a judicial
function cannot be supported.
Awards of reparation by the Interstate Commerce Commission 19
and by the Department of Agriculture under the Packers and Stock-
yards Act 0 are entered in proceedings to determine whether particular
rates are reasonable. Neither agency has the power to enforce its re-
209. Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 971-72 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
210. Administrative Procedure Act §§ 2(d)-(e), 5, 7-8, 9(b), 60 Stat. 237, 239,
241-42 (1946), as amended 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001(d)-(e), 1004, 1006-07, 1008(b) (1958).
This last section guarantees the licensee an opportunity to demonstrate compliance with
all lawful requirements. See Shuck v. SEC, 264 F.2d 358, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
211. For example, the Attorney General may impose fines on shipowners for failure
to supply passenger lists or manifests. 66 Stat. 195 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1221(d) (1958).
The Comptroller of Currency may assess fines on national banking associations which
fail to make required reports. 15 Stat. 326 (1869), 12 U.S.C. § 164 (1958). The Fed-
eral Power Commission may assess penalties against licensed public utilities that fail to
comply with orders or file reports. 49 Stat. 861 (1935), as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 825(n)
(1958).
212. The Attorney General may deny clearance to any vessel or aircraft until
penalties relating to passenger lists and manifests are paid. 66 Stat. 195 (1952), 8
U.S.C. § 1221(d) (1958).
213. TASK FORCE REP. 243-44. See also Nelson, Administrative Blackmail: The
Remission of Penalties, 4 WESTERN PoLiTIcAL Q. 610 (1951).
214. TASK FORCE REP. 243-44.
215. 24 Stat. 384 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1958).
216. 42 Stat. 165 (1921), 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1958); 46 Stat. 534 (1930), as
amended, 7 U.S.C. § 499g (1958).
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paration orders. In a court action to enforce a reparation award the
agency decision is given prima facie effect. It is thus hard to argue in
these cases that the reparation order is judicial when defendant has a
right to trial de novo in the courts. Yet, the absence of legal rules of
evidence before the Commission and the prima facie effect of Commis-
sion decisions may impair the chance for fair trial in the courts. The
Interstate Commerce Commission has itself recommended that Congress
transfer all such actions to the courts,217 since two hearings for a single
damage action seems wasteful of government resources.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The majority of problems of the administrative process today are
executive.21 Undue delay and excessive costs in the performance of
purely administrative functions of regulatory agencies are problems of
managerial efficiency. Unduly complicated procedures are the prime
cause. In addition, that minority of administrative officers who are
incompetent or irresponsible can use its delegated discretion in ways that
unlawfully injure those who are regulated, thereby wasting the nation's
resources. A partial solution is more detailed enabling statutes which
limit administrative discretion by specifying the elements of the public
interest and detailing which of these elements shall take priority over
others. Another needed preventative is the imposition of strict fiduci-
ary responsibility (with criminal penalties) upon administrative officers.
The remaining solutions to the managerial problems of administrative
agencies are not legal in nature. Efficient public administration will
result only when these problems are met and solved in terms of the
governmental objectives of the particular agencies.1 9
A minority of significant problems of the administrative process
arise from a misunderstanding of the meaning of the doctrine of separa-
217. See, e.g., 1930 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 90-93; Auerbach, Should Administrative
Agencies Perform Adjudicatory Functions?, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 95, 113.
218. The outstanding recent reports on inefficiency in administrative regulation
are LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960) (here-
inafter referred to as LANDIS REP.) ; STAFF OF SPECIAL SUBCOMmITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE
OVERSIGHT, HOUSE CoiiMi. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COI IERCE, 86TH CONG., 2 SEss.,
REPORT ON INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (Subcommittee Print 1960). See
McFarland, Landis' Report: The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness, 47 VA. L. REv.
373 (1961) ; Schwartz, Administrative Justice and Its Place in the Legal Order, 30 N.Y.
U.L. RFv. 1390, 1401-06 (1955) ; Elias, Administrative Discretion-No Solution in Sight,
45 MARQ. L. REV. 313-18 (1962) ; Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agen-
cies, 60 COLUm. L. REv. 429, 432 (1960).
219. See generally Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A
Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1954) ; Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare
State, 58 COLUAI. L. REv. 143 (1958) ; Fick, Issues and Accomplishments in Adininistra-
tive Regulation, 26 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 283 (1961).
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tion of governmental powers. Primarily there is a confusion of purely
administrative (executive) with judicial functions, resulting in an un-
necessary, time-consuming judicialization of procedures for executive
functions. Judicial-type hearings are even applied to some legislative
functions, such as rate making. The solutions to the problem of un-
necessary judicialization of legislative and executive functions in ad-
ministrative agencies must begin with rigorous definitions of the func-
tions of the three departments of government.22 The Administrative
Procedure Act and many other regulatory statutes must be revised to
replace the rule making-adjudication dichotomy with the constitutional
threefold classification; purely administrative functions must be recog-
nized if their judicialization is to be prevented. Even though the bor-
derline cases between legislative or executive functions on one side and
judicial on the other are troublesome, the distinctions are essential and
must be maintained. The broad discretion in administrative legislation
and execution is sacrificed, and the modified application of the due
process limitation to them is misapplied when their procedures are in-
appropriately judicialized.22'
Rigorous definitions of governmental powers are needed for a
reason more compelling than prevention of unnecessary judicialization
of legislative and executive procedures. That is, the preservation of
constitutional limitations on administrative officers demands a precise
definition of the judicial function. The broad discretion of these offi-
cers in the use of combined secondary legislative and executive functions
opens the possibility of great abuse of power and oppression of the
persons regulated. Under our system of judicial supremacy, the judici-
ary and, especially, judicial due process in trial courts operate as the
major checks on possible illegal oppression by administrative officers.
Since the entire judicial power of the United States is vested in our
independent judiciary, administrative agencies may not constitutionally
perform judicial functions. Furthermore, recent studies have shown
that the expediency arguments for administrative performance of judi-
cial functions, lower costs and less delay, are unsupported in fact.222
220. See generally Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for
Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1263, 1293-1318 (1962).
221. See an example involving issuance of a license in Riss & Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 907 (1951), reversing 96 F. Supp. 452 (1950). See LANDIS REP. 17; McFar-
land, supra note 218, at 430-32; Fuchs, Fairness and Effectiveness in Administrative
Agency Organization and Procedures, 36 IND. L. R v. 1, 25-29 (1960) ; BERNSTEIN, REG-
ULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COfmiISSIoN 295 (1955).
222. "Over half a century's experience with the administrative process in operation
has proven the claim of its proponents that it would realize the basic goal of every legal
system-that of dispensing speedy and inexpensive justice-to be more or less a will-o'-
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Thus the only solution is to transfer all clearly judicial functions from
administrative agencies to constitutional (Article III) courts. 23 Such
proposals have been made in the past22 and have been supported recently
by leading lawyers in the field of administrative law.2" As Judge
Friendly has so ably demonstrated, the attempted internal separation of
functions in administrative agencies has been a failure.2 26 There is no
substitute for an independent judiciary.
the-wisp. Every study that has been made of the actual working of the federal regula-
tory agencies has complained of the cumbersome and overtechnical nature of administra-
tive justice." Schwartz, The Administrative Agency in Historical Perspective, 36 IND.
L. J. 263, 270 (1961). "Expectations that administrative justice would be cheaper and
speedier than court justice have largely been disappointed." Auerbach, supra note 217,
at 108. On excessive delay in Federal Trade Commission judicial functions see Connor,
FTC Procedure Revisions: A Critique, 7 VmL. L. REv. 359-88 (1962).
223. Although the courts may be specialized, such as a Trade Court and a Labor
Court, they would still have to meet the constitutional requirements for Federal Courts.
See note 136 supra.
224. H.R. Doc. No. 6324, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) (Walter-Logan Bill). See
A.B.A., Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 61 A.B.A. REP. 720
(1936); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIrEE ON ADINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 68
(1937) ; Caldwell, A Federal Administrative Court, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 966 (1936). For
critiques see Cooper, The Proposed United States Administrative Court, 35 MICH. L.
REV. 193 (1936), 565 (1937) ; Landis, Crucial Issues in Administrative Law-The
Walter-Logan Bill, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1077 (1940). See generally Heady & Linenthal,
Congress and Administrative Regulation, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 238 (1961) ; TASK
FORCE REP. 239-56. See Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1273, 1283-
89 (1955).
225. A.B.A., Report of the Special Committee on Legal Services and Procedure, 81
A.B.A. REP. 494-95 (1956) ; Benjamin, A Lawyer's View of Administrative Procedure-
The American Bar Association Program, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203, 219-23 (1961) ;
Schwartz, supra note 222, at 280; Berger, Removal of Judicial Functions from Federal
Trade Commission to a Trade Court: A Reply to Mr. Kintner, 59 MICH. L. REv. 199,
204-06 (1960) ; Clark, The Judicial Fuctions of the Federal Trade Commission Should
be Transferred to the District Courts, 12 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION RE'. 51 (1957).
226. As stated by Judge Friendly: "I trust no one is so naive as to think that the
separation of staff function decreed by the Administrative Procedure Act really works."
Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 COLUms. L. REv. 429, 438
(1960). See Berger, supra note 225, at 206-11.
